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ABSTRACT: 
In light of the recent policy changes and liberalization in Indian economy this study explores 
the impact of mergers and acquisitions on 8 Indian manufacturing industries over the period 
1988 to 2008. Four measures of performance viz. Profit before interest and tax to sales ratio, 
Net Profit Ratio, Return on asset and Technical efficiency have been used to obtain the 
results and verify the robustness. The first three measures are derived from accounting studies 
and last measure calibrates changes in productivity by using Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Technique. Three major estimation techniques namely least square method, Random effects 
model and Instrumental Variable GMM estimator have been used to obtain the results and 
verify robustness of results. The results indicate acquisitions are value enhancing when 
Technical Efficiency is used as a measure of performance. This result is consistent under all 
the estimation techniques. When accounting measures of performance are used merger do not 
have a significant impact on company profitability. This can be attributed to increasing 
overhead costs like research and development expenditure and advertisement expenditure of 
Indian industries. Mergers leading to high technical efficiency should prompt researchers to 
reconsider the utility of measures used to evaluate the effects of M&A. 
Key words: Mergers and acquisitions, Event Studies, Productivity, Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis, Measures of Performance.  
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Introduction: 
In recent times the world has seen an unprecedented rise in Merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activities owing to dispersion of technology and globalization. It is alleged that M&A assists 
a company to meet its aspirations of quick growth with limited technology, market access, 
time and finance. The following figure exhibits the mounting size and value of M&A deals in 
the world as compared to world GDP. 
Figure 1: Trends of M&A activity in the world 
 
Source: Cools et al (2007), BCG group report, p.10 
From the above figure it is evident that subsequent to year 2000 the number of deals has 
taken a slight dip. Yet the most remarkable feature of current trend is that the value of deals 
has nearly doubled after 2002. Value of Deals is currently growing at a compound annual 
growth rate of 20% as opposed 15% from 1981-2006 (Cools et al, 2007) save the case of 
economic crises after 2007. 
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Merger and acquisition activities occur in waves. These waves are both industry-wide and 
firm-wide. To put it differently mergers have a cyclical pattern with intense merger periods 
followed by periods involving very few mergers. Six such waves can be noticed in the history 
of world mergers. The periods of these waves, their outcomes and the countries involved are 
shown in the table below: 
Table 1: Merger waves of the world 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 
Period 1890s±1903 
 
1910s±1929 1950s±1973 1981±1989 1993±2001 2003-
present 
 
Geographical 
scope 
US US US, UK, 
Europe, Asia 
US, UK, 
Europe, Asia 
US, UK, 
Europe, Asia 
US, UK, 
Europe, 
Asia 
Outcome Formation 
of 
monopolies  
 
Formation 
of 
oligopolies 
Growth 
through 
diversification 
 
Elimination of 
inefficiencies  
Adjustment to 
globalization 
processes 
 
Global 
Expansion 
Source: Cited in M. Martynova, L. Renneboog / Journal of Banking & Finance 32 (2008) 2148±2177 p.2151 
The commencement of each wave coincides with political economic or regulatory changes 
(Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). All these waves occur during economic recovery and end 
in a market crash, war or energy crisis. USA has been a major player in merger market since 
the first wave. It had approximately 46.5% share in the value of world deals for a period of 
1997 to 2006. 
1.1 Trends of mergers and acquisitions in India:  
Capitalist nations have witnessed a prominent trend in merger and acquisition activity since 
late nineteenth century but not until recently has this phenomenon been so common in the 
developing countries. India experienced massive growth in the number of mergers and 
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acquisitions in post-liberalization era (since May 1991) due to widespread restructuring 
activities (e.g. Khanna, 1997; Venkiteshwaran, 1997; Roy 1999; Beena 2000; Mishra, 2005; 
Agarwal & Bhattacharya, 2006; Mantravedi & Redi, 2008). Partial self-reliance existed in 
India until the New Industrial Policy in 1991 (when liberalization was introduced). Following 
the liberalization highly-efficient foreign firms started entering the Indian markets forcing 
Indian firms to be more efficient. Hence take the route of M&A to survive the competition.  
Merger activity in developed countries is driven by industrial and regulatory shocks (Agarwal 
& Bhattacharya, 2006). The clustering observed in Indian mergers was an indication of such 
shocks. The commencement of economic reforms in India can be seen as industry shocks and 
amendments in MRTP act and other regulations can be viewed as regulatory shock (Agarwal 
& Bhatacharya, 2006). Nevertheless Agrawal (2005) finds a negative relationship between 
industrial shocks and merger activity in India and attributes this to nascent corporate strategy 
and product market competition.  
India has seen three major merger waves after liberalization. In the first wave (1990-95) the 
Indian corporate sector was busy invigorating to face competition from foreign firms. During 
the second wave (1995-00) large number of multinational companies had entered Indian 
market and with the progression of the current wave, India has seen a great leap in merger 
and acquisition activity. For instance year 2006 saw 115 takeovers as opposed to 15 in 1988.  
Figure 2 illustrates the trend of merger and acquisitions in India during the last wave.  
Various factors like buoyancy in economy, favourable government policies, availability of 
required liquidity, vision and attitude of Indian entrepreneurs aided the rising trend of Indian 
Mergers and Acquisitions. Subsequent to year 2007 (seen in figure 3) the merger and 
acquisition activity in India has slowed down due to economic crises. In year 2009, against 
the trend of cross-border acquisition seen in last decade, India was forced to look within the 
country due to slowdown. 60% of the mergers were domestic in that year. However first 45 
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days of year 2010 saw a whooping figure of $ 14 billion of deals announced and even the 
global trend is increasing since last quarter of 2009 (The economic times). Yet it will still 
take some time to reach the level reached in year 2007.   
Figure 2: Trend of mergers and acquisitions in India during the last wave 
 
6RXUFH$FFHQWXUHµ+LJK3HUIRUPDQFHRIPHUJHUVDQGDFTXLVLWLRQV,QGLD¶V1HZ'\QDPLFV¶S 
The Indian merger waves were dominated by horizontal mergers. A lot of credit for this goes 
to the relaxation of provisions of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act. 
Provisions demanding prior approval of government before undertaking mergers were 
removed. These amendments made restructuring activities very easy (Agarwal & 
Bhatacharya 2006).  
The number of M&A varies widely across industries. The most common industries indulging 
in these activities were financial and other services, electronics, electrical machinery, 
chemicals, drugs and pharmaceuticals, beverages, steel and Telecom. A broad classification 
of M&A activities for a decade (1st and 2nd wave) can be seen in the following table: 
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Table2: M&A trends 
Year Non-Manufacturing Manufacturing Total 
1990-95 (1st wave) 116 175 291 (20) 
1995-00 (2nd wave) 233 510 743 (236) 
1900-00 349 685 1034 (256) 
Source: P.L.Beena (2004), Working paper 301, p.11 
The escalation of mergers and acquisition activities in Indian economy in recent years drove 
my attention to this topic. I desire to uncover the aftermaths of these activities on Indian 
companies and on the economy as a whole. A huge discrepancy exists in literature regarding 
if mergers enhance the performance of the firm. For instance Cosh et al (1980), Bradley et al 
(1988), Servaes (1991)  and Sharkas et al (2008) derive evidences in favour of mergers while 
Rau et al (1998),  Dickerson et al (1997) and Mishra and Chandra (2010 ) deduce that 
mergers destroy value. India being at the initial stages of such activities not much work has 
been done on this topic. Furthermore scholars who have tried to investigate this topic have 
restricted their research in four major ways. Firstly they have constrained their study to a 
particular industry or very few merger cases (Mishra and Chandra, 2010; Mann et al, 2008). 
Secondly they have used only 1 methodology for measuring performance (Mishra and 
Chandra, 2010; Benna, 2004; Pawaskar, 2001). Lastly at the most 2 models are used in 
deriving results and dynamics of profits is not explored (Mishra and Chandra, 2010).  
From this perspective my contribution can be stated in three ways (1) Rather than confining 
my research to a particular industry I explore the effects of mergers and acquisitions on 8 
major manufacturing industries. My data consists of 4004 companies which includes 239 
merger cases. (2) I analyse the effects of mergers and acquisitions on four different measures 
of performance viz. PBIT/sales, PAT/sales, ROA and Technical efficiency. The first three 
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measures stated are accounting measures of performance while the last one captures changes 
in productivity of a company i.e. two different methodologies are used one accounting 
method and second Productivity and Frontier Techniques. (3) Three different models namely 
OLS, Random effects model and instrumental variable GMM approach are used in the study. 
Existence of dynamics in profits is also investigated and I have attempted to include all the 
major independent variables discussed in the literature.  
The key reason for using varied measures of performance and models is to check the 
robustness of results across these measures and models. Hence check if change in methods or 
models influence the significance of results in a substantial way. Contradictory results 
observed by Caves (1989) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1989) across different 
measures of performance and different methodologies, motivated this thought. 
The effects of M&A on the performance of the company are checked with the help of 
structural conduct performance framework used by Mishra and Chandra, (2010). Here the 
four measures of performance (PBIT/Sales, PAT/Sales, ROA and TE) are regressed against 
the independent variables chosen in the study one of which is a dummy variable capturing 
effects of merger. The second methodology mentioned (Productivity and Frontier 
Techniques) is used to derive technical efficiency scores which is later used as a measure of 
performance in the (SCP) framework specified above.  
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 reviews the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 describes the methodology and models used at 
length. Section 4 list the data source, variables and summary statistics. Section 5 analyses the 
results derived and section 6 draws the final conclusion and section 7 includes limitations of 
research and scope for further investigation.   
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2. Literature Review: 
Before moving on to the rest of the research let us first understand what a merger means. In 
the words of Ross et al (2008)  
³A merger is a complete absorption of one firm by another. The acquiring firm retains               
its name and its identity, and it acquirers all the assets and liabilities of acquired firms. After         
a merger, the acquired firm ceases to exist as a separate business entity´ 
The Indian Income tax act 1961 uses the term amalgamation for merger. 
2.1 Types of Mergers: 
Mergers can be categorized into 3 types based on whether they are undertaken at the same 
level of economic activity.  
Horizontal Mergers: 
³Horizontal mergers involve two firms that operate and compete in same kind of business 
activity´ :HVWRQ HW DO , p.6). A few real world examples of such mergers are 
amalgamation between Mobil and Exxon, Daimler-Benz and Chrysler etc. Firms generally 
opt for horizontal mergers to gain monopoly power or to control prices.  Horizontal mergers 
are sometimes anti-competitive and are regulated by government as they reduce the number 
of companies in an industry, permitting firms to collude for monopoly powers. The relaxation 
of Monopoly and Trade practices (MRTP) after June 1991 has made such mergers common 
in Indian economy.  
Vertical Mergers:  
³Vertical Merger takes place when two firms in different stages of production/operation 
merge either to creating forward or backward integration´ (Shridhar, 2008, p.514). Merger 
of Merck, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, with Medco, a pharmaceutical distributor can be 
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cited as an example of vertical merger. Firms can undergo vertical mergers for various 
reasons, A few of them may be to avoid transaction costs, communication costs, costs of 
searching, contracting and making payments to suppliers and availing the required products 
at cheaper prices.  Some vertical mergers can foreclose competitors from obtaining required 
inputs or may raise costs for it. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) may prevent such 
mergers when they suspect violation of antitrust laws. One such merger which alarmed 
FTC but was later agrees was between Time Warner Incorporated and Turner Corporation.   
Conglomerate Mergers: 
Conglomerate mergers are between firms with no common business ties. Montgomery Ward 
and Mobil oil merger is an example of conglomerate merger. Conglomerate mergers can be 
of bifurcated into 3 types (Weston et al, 2004) based on the reason behind the undertaking the 
merger. They are: Product market extension wherein the firms extend their product lines 
through mergers, these are also called concentric mergers. Geographic market extension in 
which firms try to explore different geographic locations through acquisitions and other 
conglomerate mergers or pure conglomerate mergers between unrelated mergers which can 
neither be classified as neither product extension nor geographic extension.   
2.2 Motives behind mergers and acquisition: 
We have seen the rising trend in mergers in recent times but what drives companies towards 
such decision will be worth discussing. Literature suggests that M&As are undertaken to 
realize various motives, so no single approach can condense full account. (Steiner 1975, 
Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987) For instance Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) talk about 3 
major motives namely synergy, agency and hubris while Trautwein (1990) classifies it into 
seven groups. Brouthers (1998) bifurcates it into economic, personal and strategic motives 
and lists 17 of them whereas Napier (1989) categorizes it into financial or value-maximizing 
motives and managerial or non-value maximizing motives. Nonetheless it should also be 
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noted that occurrence and intensity of merger activity depends on factors like corporate 
governance, sources and availability of capital, traditions, capital market size and structure 
and legal structure which varies across countries, so motives for mergers can also be expected 
to differ across countries (Agrawal et al, 2005). Hence here are a few theories on motives 
widely discussed and accepted in the acquisition literature, relevant to the methodology used 
here and suitable in Indian context. 
2.2.1 Synergy & Efficiency theory: 
Synergy states that the value of combined firm is worth more than the two firms 
independently. That is:  
஺ܸ஻ ൐ ஺ܸ ൅ ஻ܸ 
Where ஺ܸ஻ is the value of combined firm and ஺ܸand ஻ܸis the value of each firm individually. 
Bradley et al (1988) confirmed this by showing an increase of 7.4% in value of combined 
firm when a successful acquisition occurs.  
Efficiency theory provides a justification behind this synergy. Efficiency gains can flow from 
M&A activity in various ways. Listing a few may include economies of scope and scale, 
cutting the overlapping expenditure like research and development,  product rationalization, 
technological progress and combining advertisement and distribution channels (Ansoff and 
Weston, 1962).  Rhoades (1998) finds evidence of substantial cost cutting in the US banks 
covered under his study. 
Synergy argument is widely used by merger makers to validate their actions (Porter 1987; 
Maremont and Mitchell, 1988). Seth et al, Brigham (1982) Van Horne (1982) titles synergy 
as a major explanation for mergers as observed from their sample.  However Jensen relaxes 
this assumption by arguing that this may not be the driving motive but is the aggregate effect. 
Synergies can be distinguished into 3 types (Trauteman, 1990) namely 
Financial synergy: 
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Financial Synergy can lead to lower cost of capital or higher cash-flows. Lower cost of 
capital can be achieved due to size advantages as finance may be available at lower costs that 
is, the debt capacity increases (Lewellen, 1971; Galai and Masulis, 1976); or reducing 
systemic risk by investing in unrelated business; or by establishing internal capital market 
which can function on superior information and thus reducing cost of capital. An 
amalgamation of companies with lower cost of capital and cash flows and high cash-flows 
and high cost-of capital can create synergy. 
Operational synergy: 
Operational Synergy allows an enterprise to increase its operating income or growth or both. 
This is done by achieving economies of scale, reduction in production costs or knowledge 
transfers or higher growth in new markets by acquiring firms with established distribution 
networks in those markets. Bhide (1993) investigated the motives of 77 mergers in 1985 and 
1986 and reported that one-third of them were driven to achieve operational synergy. 
Managerial synergy: 
Managerial Synergy is realized when a more efficient management acquires a less efficient 
one, thus providing both social and private gain.  
Evidence on synergy argument can be obtained with help of event studies and accounting 
studies discussed later in section. Supporting evidences of overall increase in efficiency with 
the help of event studies is found by David and McConnel (1986), Ravenscraft and Scherer 
(1987). However it should be noted here that most of the benefits are owing to gains accruing 
to target shareholders. Shareholders of acquiring firms are barely benefitted by mergers. 
Moreover a serious doubt can be cast on the assumption of efficient markets needed under 
event studies. No concluding evidence of increase in efficiency can be deduced from 
accounting studies.  So if financial statements are to be believed than efficiency theory needs 
to be rejected.  
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Kitching (1967) claimed financial synergy to be more achievable than operational synergy.  
Chaterjee (1986) supported this evidence through his findings but recently efficiency theory 
has attracted a lot of criticism. Financial synergies through efficient capital markets or 
reduction of systematic risk are hard to achieve (Rumelt, 1986; Montgomery and Singh, 
1984) while size effects can still be achieved (Scherer et al, 1975). Even managerial and 
operational synergies are seldom realized (Porter, 1987).  
2.2.2Market Power Theory: 
One of the driving forces behind mergers and acquisitions is to increase market share of a 
firm enabling monopoly control in the environment in which the firm operates (Alan and 
Stuart, 2004). This theory is generally related to profit maximization. With increase in market 
power, industry concentration rises. This enables a firm to endure in deteriorating economic 
condition and aids in increasing profitability. It also assists the company to have some control 
over the prices of the product concerned.  
Stigler, (1950) claims merger wave of 1887-DV³PHUJHUVIRUPRQRSRO\´DQG-1929 
PHUJHU ZDYH DV ³PHUJHUV IRU ROLJRSRO\´ $ JOREDO UHVHDUFK RI  FRPSDQLHV ZRUOGZLGH
conducted by KPMG stated that 54% of the mergers were either for gaining market share or 
protecting old market share (KPMG 1999).  But with the advent of anti-merger legislation in 
1950, mergers among competing firms became rare. A 30% or above share in the market was 
termed as an indication of monopoly power save a few cases where most of the firms have 
such market shares. Later with relaxation of such laws mergers did occur but after being 
reviewed by antitrust and other regulatory agencies.  
Increase in market power is generally related to horizontal mergers as under this kind of 
merger a firm can soon acquire huge volume of operations and control over prices, thus 
limiting competition, difficult to be achieved through any other form of restructuring activity. 
Gurglers et al. (2003) find evidence in support of market power expansion in related 
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mergers. Up till the advent of liberalization policy in 1991, MRTP Act required Indian 
companies to take approval of government for mergers that were believed to have created 
monopoly power but after amendments such mergers have become very common. One such 
example of Indian merger where competition was eliminated with the help of merger was 
Amalgamation between Mahindra and Mahindra and Punjab Tractors (PTL).   
Nevertheless it should be mentioned that monopoly power can also be achieved in 
conglomerate mergers in following ways: 
1. Competition can simultaneously be limited in more than one market. One of the ways to 
achieve is to indulge into tacit conspiracy with the competitors in more than one market. 
An illustration of this may be building a footing in the main market of the competitor 
ZKRDOUHDG\KDVDSRVLWLRQLQFRQFHUQHGFRPSDQ\¶VPDLQPDUNHWPorter, 1985). 
2.  The company can aim at discouraging potential entrants in its markets. A concentric 
acquisition by market leader can help achieving this.  
3. Cross-subsidization of products is possible. Profits from one product can be used for to 
achieve market share of another product.  
Such benefits can be termed as competitor interrelationships (Porter, 1985) or collusive 
synergies (Chatterjee, 1986). Thus they can be compared with synergy theory. However 
collusive synergy is mere a transfer of wealth and does not lead to any efficiency gains unlike 
other synergies (Trautwein, 1990).   Though this motive may be relevant in domestic market 
its application is limited in foreign market except if firm international oligopoly is possible by 
potential price fixing (Buckley 2001). The merger of AOL and Time Warner can be 
considered as a conglomerate to gain market power.  
Trautwein (1990) states the effect of monopoly power to be weak. Supporting evidence is 
drawn by Fee and Thompson (2004) in recent times. While Geiger (2009) states that 
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monopoly power may not be a major motive in concentrated industry but in fragmented 
industry its importance cannot be overlooked.  
2.2.3Tax benefits: 
Tax gains, though not a major motive may be considered as a potential determinant of merger 
activity. Tax gains can be in form of 
(i) Using tax losses of the target firm to reduce tax liability: A company with significant tax 
liability can find company with huge operating losses attractive so that the combined firm has 
lower tax bills in comparison to both the firms together. This is possible due to loss carry 
forward provisions.  
(ii) Unused debt capacity of the target can be used for borrowing capital as interest expenses 
can provide a tax shield and thus the acquiring company can reduce its tax bills.  
(iii) The assets are generally re-valued during acquisitions. These revaluations are generally 
in the form of writing up the values of certain assets which would mean higher amount of 
depreciation can be provided thus reducing tax burden for coming years. But taxes on 
written-ups generally offset such benefits (Ross et al 2008). 
5RPDQR¶VVWXG\EDUHO\ILQGDQ\HYLGHQFHRIWKLVPRWLYHKDYLQJVLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWRQ
takeover activity. Since tax-reforms Act 1986 the potential for any tax benefits for acquirers 
was reduced. This loss of tax benefit gave rise to number of mergers for this motive in 1986 
to beat the higher taxes that were applicable from 1987. 
The tax advantages mentioned above are available under sec 72A of Indian Income tax Act 
1961. Absorption of former Reliance Petroleum by Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL) can be cited 
as an example of merger for such tax-benefits (Shridhar 2008). A more recent example of 
merger announcement on 30th August 2010 between RIL and East India Hotels can also be 
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considered for this motive. These examples that tax benefits as a motive of merger in India 
cannot be neglected.  
2.2.4 Hubris: 
The theories discussed above talked about reduction of costs or increasing economies of scale 
(Efficiency Theory), increasing profitability by getting better control over market (Market 
Power theory), increasing productivity (matching theory) or gaining tax benefits (Tax 
advantage) through mergers. All these theories support the hypothesis that mergers create 
value. Nevertheless thHQH[W WZRWKHRULHVZLOO WU\ WRH[SODLQWKHGLVFUHSDQF\³:K\PHUJHUV
VHHPWREHGHVWUR\LQJYDOXHPRVWRIWKHWLPHV´ 
Ross (1986) puts forward an explanation of managerial hubris through his model, for high 
takeover failure rate in every merger wave. Hubris of management is generally related to 
overestimation of purchase cost due to managerial overconfidence. This is in line with 
%ODFN¶VRYHUSD\PHQWK\SRWKHVLVZKHUHLQKHSRVWXODWHV WKDWRYHURSWLPLVWLFPDQDJHUV
overpay the targets. Even Malmendier et al (2005) suggest that less profitable takeovers are 
generally undertaken by optimistic managers. The key reason behind such overpayments and 
optimism is the dissimilar interests of managers and shareholders. Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004) report one-third of the big European acquisitions in 1990 were a prey to managerial 
hubris.  
Weston et al (2003) postulates that under Hubris there is a transfer of wealth from acquiring 
firm to the target firm making the total return from the merger zero. Hubris states that the 
increased price of shares of target firm should return to its original price in case of an 
unsuccessful takeover except if any other bids are received. Such patters have been confirmed 
by Bradley et al (1983) and Asquith (1983). Typically under this theory the following 
changes can be seen in the prices of acquirers in case of unanticipated bid and if the bid 
conveys no information about the acquirer other which target company is it planning to 
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acquire: (i) a decline in price of shares on bid announcement (ii) an increase in prices on 
abandoning or losing the bid (iii) a price reduction on winning the bid (Roll 1986). However 
according to Shipper and Thomson (1983) such conditions are not possible in real world. As 
prior information regarding the bid is always available and acts like abandoning the bid may 
cast doubts on the ability of the acquiring firm to pay.  
Martynova et al (2008) very well explains the cyclical patterns in merger waves by 
FRPELQLQJ5ROO¶V+XEULVK\SRWKHVLVZLWKKHUGLQJ¶VSUHGLFWLRQRIILUPVPLPLFNLQJWKHDFWLRQV
of the leader. He states that in a merger wave subsequent mergers are encouraged by initial 
successful takeovers. As the other managers are mimicking the leader and do not have any 
economic incentive these takeovers suffer from managerial Hubris. According to Ross Hubris 
is essential to explain why unfavourable offers are not abandoned by managers Seyhum 
(1990) also deduced that takeovers are motivated by hubris and agency problems. Thus 
enough evidence is found in the literature to not to neglect Hubris as an important motive of 
mergers.   
2.2.5 Agency costs: 
Managers act as agents of the shareholders. Various conflicts emerge amid the interest of 
shareholders and managers in the course of business. Agency theory is based on examination 
of such conflicts. To put it differently agency problems arise when managers give more 
importance to their personal benefits (like luxurious offices, membership in expensive clubs, 
office cars) over maximization of shareholders wealth. The key reason behind these problems 
is separation of ownership and management in the company. This theory was formulated by 
-HQVHQDQG0HFNOLQJ,QPRVWRIWKHELJILUPVLWLVWKHPDQDJHU¶VGHFLVLRQUDWKHUWKDQ
VKDUHKROGHU¶VGHFLVLRQZKHWKHUWRJRIRUDQDFTXLVLWLRQ-HQVHQMX[WDSRVHVWKDWZKHQ
booming financial markets leave excessive funds at managers discretion agency problems 
spur. Managers with free cash-flows tend to acquire new firms to grow in size rather than 
distribute it to shareholders. Evidence has shown that managers with excessive free cash-
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flows teQG WR RYHUELG DQG GHVWUR\ VKDUHKROGHU¶V YDOXH )RU LQVWDQFH VXSSRUWLQJ SURRI RI
acquirers with high free cash flows suffering from negative abnormal return is found by 
Harford (1999). Managers have personal incentives in form of higher compensation and more 
power if they grow above an optimal size (Jensen 1986). Moreover mergers undertaken for 
diversification are induced by an intention to stabilize earnings of a company which then 
ZRXOG SURWHFW PDQDJHU¶V SRVLWLRQV $PLKXG DQG /HY  6KOHLIHU HW DO 91) claimed 
that third merger wave was motivated by personal objectives of managers as prior to 1980 
PDQDJHUV VFDUFHO\ FRQFHQWUDWHG RQ VKDUHKROGHU¶V JDLQV  7KH PHUJHU RI 9RGDIRQH DQG
Mannesmann is frequently quoted as an example of principle-agent problems.  
Thus agency theory states that managers give preference to their personal gains instead of 
adding value for shareholders.  
2.3 M&As and Performance: The Evidence 
The effects of mergers and acquisitions on company performance have remained a debatable 
issue since last century. Numerous intellectuals have tried to analyse the impact of M&As by 
using quantitative or qualitative measures and have derived contradictory results. Hence 
whether mergers lead to value creation or not is dubious. A merger can be termed as value 
creating if it satisfies at least one of the following conditions: (i) It creates value for 
shareholders in the sense the return of the merged firm should exceed the expected return of 
the investors. This increase in return can be in form of capital gains due to rising share prices 
or dividend gains/ growth opportunities because of high accounting profitability reported. (ii) 
It creates value for the society by manufacturing goods at lower cost due to efficient 
utilization of inputs and outputs. To restate the statement, merger should lead to increase in 
productivity of a firm (Lichtenberg et al, 1987).  
It is generally expected that if mergers are said to enhance performance they should show 
value creation by any method used to quantify performance but surprisingly evidences 
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suggest that this is not the case. Working on same data set researchers get contradictory 
results when different measures of performance are used (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987, 
7KXVWKHWHUPµDWOHDVWRQH¶KDVEHHQ used to define value creation for this study. Now 
if mergers do not create value then there are two possible outcomes: either they can be value 
neutral, denotation neither the shareholders nor the society has to suffer a loss though they do 
not accrue any gains. Or value destroying in the sense that both shareholders as well as 
society have to suffer because of the wrongly undertaken merger. The motives discussed in 
the previous section fit very well in one or more of the value hypothesis. For example 
Synergy, Market Power and Tax benefits lead to value creation; Hubris can be value neutral 
or value destroying and agency theory supports value destroying hypothesis.  
Diverse methods are available in literature to measure performance in quantitative or 
qualitative form. But for the purpose of this study we restrict ourselves to only quantitative 
measures for computing change in performance. There are three major methods available (i) 
Event Studies (ii) Accounting Studies (iii) Productivity or frontier analysis. These methods 
are explained at length below:  
 2.3.1 Event studies: 
This study deals with the first condition of value creation. It states that Shareholders are the 
owners of a company, therefore the focus should be on the effect of merger on shareholders 
wealth, and an appropriate measure of performance should quantify such changes in 
shareholders wealth (Jensen 1984). Event studies enable us to determine abnormal stock price 
changes around unanticipated events. These studies have been widely used to examine the 
UHWXUQVWRVKDUHKROGHUVLQVKRUWUXQDVZHOODVORQJUXQ7XFKDQG2¶6XOOLYDQ(YHQW
study approach was developed in finance in 1968 &1969 by Ball et al & Fama et al 
respectively and is widely applied despite its drawbacks and some cautions on its 
applicability. Event study requires a major assumption of markets being efficient ((i.e., to say 
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WKDW WKH ILUP¶V VWRFN SULFHV UHIOHFW DOO WKH DYDLODEOH LQIRUPDWLRQ  UHJDUGLQJ H[SHFWHG IXWXUH
profitability) and hence movements in share prices reflect economic impact of acquisitions 
(Dickerson et al, 1997) but share price movements around announcement dates of M&As can 
be attributed not only to efficient market but also to factors such as undervaluation of share 
owing to investors overlooking of the company or overvaluation by companies acquiring it 
(Shiler, 1989 p 65). Researchers favouring event studies argue that as compared to other 
methods like accounting ratios (which will be explained later) this method is forward looking 
as stock market prices reflect present values of expected future cash-flows (Brumer, 2000). 
Following points describe the procedure involved in event study in brief. 
Procedure: 
Choosing an event of interest and event window. 
 The event of interest here is mergers and acquisitions. Event window is the time period for 
which investigation is carried out and can be broadly classified into short-run and long-run. 
Short-run is calculated in days and months around announcement periods and long-run in 
months and years. There is no consensus on the period to be chosen as short term. It ranges 
from -4 to +1 months used by Franks and Haris (1989) to -1 and +1 day used by Mitchel and 
Leh (1990). Similarly the period chosen for long term varies from 0 to 5 years chosen by 
Agrawal et al (1992) and Loughran and Vijh (1997) to +1 to +240 days chosen by Asquith 
(1983) 
Selection criterion for firms to be included in the research: 
Firms in the sample are cautiously chosen to keep it free from any kind of biases. Choice of 
firms depend on various factors, a few of them may include availability of data, country or 
industry of investigation, period of study, type of mergers investigated etc. 
Calculating normal or expected return: 
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The important issue is to identify the correct counterfactual namely what would have 
happened if the firm had not merged. This is done with the help of market model, CAPM or 
S&P500 used for calculating the normal/expected return. The most commonly used model is 
the market model and is calculated as follows 
ܴ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ܴ௠௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
Computing the abnormal return  
Abnormal return measures the additional profit that the firm will make over and above the 
normal return due to the merger. Equation  is taken from Mickanlay (1997) 
ܣܴ௜௧ ൌ ܴ௜௧ െ ܧሺܴ௜௧ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ?  
the abnormal return is the difference between ܴ௜௧, the raw return of the firm calculated as the 
FKDQJHLQVKDUHSULFHSOXVDQ\GLYLGHQGVSDLGGLYLGHGE\WKHSUHYLRXVGD\¶VFORVLQJSULFHRI
the share and ܧሺܴ௜௧ ௜ܺ௧ሻ ?  the expected return calculated above. 
Aggregation of abnormal returns:  
Aggregation is done in order to draw necessary inferences and to account for informational 
leakages before and after the announcements.  
ܥܣܴ௜ሺ˕ଵ˕ଶሻ ൌ ෍ ܣܴ௜௧˕మ௧ୀ˕భ  
It is done in two dimensions: through time and across securities. After aggregation, the 
information can be presented in form of graphs or some statistical test can be conducted to 
check its significance of the aggregated values.  
  
Event studies provide insights about returns to target firm shareholders, acquirers and 
combination of both. These studies have consistently found that target shareholders have 
earned significant abnormal returns (Dennis and McConnell, 1986; Schwert, 1996; DeLong 
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2001). Furthermore, Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) discover that when takeovers are 
announced target company shareholders make a profit even if the deal does not get through. 
While acquirer shareholders barely earned anything. In fact returns to acquirer shareholders 
are found to be negative by most studies (Dodd, 1980; Servaes, 1991; Houston et al, 2001). 
Combined returns are however found to be positive (Servaes, 1991; Houston et al, 2001). On 
account of wide range of literature on event studies only the main findings are explained 
below and other studies are described in table 1. 
 
Recent studies have focused on long-run performance and casted some doubt on short-run 
window chosen for measuring performance owing to the acceptance that though stock prices 
adjust to the newly available information, it is difficult for the markets  to measure the 
immediate strategic fit properly and even more when some restructuring changes are on the 
way (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992). 
 
Nonetheless even long-run event studies are exposed to various defects. For example in long-
run there may be overlapping of event periods that is the occurrence of subsequent firm 
specific events which may affect share-prices (like other takeovers). 
 
Moreover since Fama and French 1992 finance literature has questioned the dependability of 
Beta as a measure of risk. Future stock returns are explained largely by two measures namely 
size and book to market ratio as a result the computation of Abnormal return has undergone a 
change. The first methodology to control for this risk was used by Loughran and Vijh (1997). 
+HEDVHGKLVPHWKRGRORJ\RQDFTXLULQJILUP¶VJHRPHWULFUHWXUQFRPSDULVRQRYHUILYH\HDUV
and comparable company in form of size to book value ratio. Nevertheless this method 
suffered from some limitations. Firstly the matched company and acquiring company change 
over time and so the book to market ratio so there was an element of risk attached to it. Rau 
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and Vermaelen (1998) indicated a lot of variation in the risk factors and criticized this 
method.  He showed that only 19% of the companies fall in the same group after 3 years. 
Secondly Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) show the limitations of 
the statistical method over long-term and have preferred bootstrap over this method.    
Alexandridis et al. (2006) used three factor model by Fama and French alongwith the usual 
CAPM model both these models result in negative abnormal returns close to 1%.  
Table 3: Evidences on event studies 
Researcher Period Sample 
size  
Event window 
 
Results 
Langetieg (1978) 1929-69 149 (-120,0)  
days 
Positive returns to target firm 
shareholders 10.63% 
 Firth (1980) 1969-73 434 (-48, 36) 
months 
Target firms were benefitted, acquirers 
made a loss and there was an overall loss 
reported.  
Asquith(1983) 1962-76 285 (1, 240) 
 Days 
Loss of 7.2% to successful biders 
Dennis and 
McConnell 
(1986) 
1962-80 76 (-1, 0)  
days 
Target shareholders earn significant 
abnormal returns of 8.56%.  
Acquirers earn a return of -
0.12%.However the results were not 
significant. 
Bradley, Desai, 
Kim (1988) 
1963-84 236 (-5, 5)  
days 
The study reported 37.77% returns to 
target shareholders 
Servaes (1991) 1972-87 704 (-1, close) Target shareholders get positive returns 
of 23.64% (significant) and combined 
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days return of 3.66% (positive and significant) 
Bannerjee, Owers 
(1992) 
1978-87 33 (-1,0 ) 
days 
Statistically significant positive abnormal 
returns of 137.7 million was stated to 
target shareholders while loss of -3.3% 
was found. 
Schwert (1996) 1975-91 666 (-42,126) 
days 
Acquirers earn a return of +1.4% while 
target firms earn a return of 26.3% 
Loughran and 
Vijh (1997) 
1970-89 434 (0 to 5) 
years 
Acquirer loss of -6.5% reported. The 
results are insignificant. However target 
shareholders make a profit of 29.6% 
(significant) 
Rau, Vermaelen 
(1998) 
1980-91 3968 (0, 36) 
months 
Negative return of -4% is found for 
acquirers.  
Andrade (2001) 1973-98 3688 
transaction
s 
(-3 ,3) 
days 
Target shareholders abnormal return is 
found to be 16% Acquiring firms return 
is not significantly different from zero 
and combined abnormal return is 1.8% 
DeLong (2001) 1988-95 280 (-10,1 ) 
days 
Target firms earn a positive significant 
returns of 16.61 % while acquirers earn a 
negative significant returns of 1.68% 
Houston et al 
(2001) 
1985-96 64 (-4,1) 
 days 
Combined positive abnormal return of 
1.86%  and return of +20,80% accrue to 
target firms. Both results are significant. 
Alexandrities et 
al (2006) 
1991-98 179 (0, 36) 
months 
Loss in the range of ±o.55% to -1.02% 
(significant) reported 
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2.3.2 Accounting ratios: 
Event studies have been widely used in literature to measure profitability of mergers and 
acquisitions but the reliability of results generated from these studies have been questioned 
E\ YDULRXV UHVHDUFKHV $FFRUGLQJ WR -HQVHQ DQG 5XEDFN VWRFN PDUNHW¶V LQIRrmational 
efficiency has been overrated and the stock price changes during takeovers overestimate the 
future efficiency gains of them. (chattergy and Meeks). The beta estimates used for 
calculating abnormal returns are challenged by Conn (1985). He states that the calculation of 
abnormal returns is likely to be prejudiced because of these estimates.  
 
Researchers have preferred accounting measures of performance to capture the effects of 
mergers as any change in performance will eventually be reflected in firms financial 
statements. Following the pioneering efforts of Geoffrey Meeks (1977) several scholars have 
tried to evaluate the effects of mergers through this study by either comparing profits of firms 
with control group of non-merged group or comparing pre-merger and post-merger profits. In 
light of the survey conducted by Ingham et al (1992) primary motive for mergers and 
acquisitions is the anticipation of increased profitability. But since Fisher and McGowan 
(1983) there has been an intense debate on the reliability of using accounting data to measure 
economic rate of return and thus performance. It has been argued that this method is 
backward looking and is prone to problems like creative accounting (Griffiths 1986). 
Moreover Chatterjee and Meeks (1996) suggest that changes introduced in treatment of 
goodwill in post-merger period, considerably affects the results drawn from accounting 
studies.  
The methods used for evaluating accounting returns are diverse and ranges across measuring 
operating performance with help of cash-flows; net income, Return on Equity, Return on 
asset and leverage so no common procedure can be shown as done for event studies.  
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Meeks (1977) examined the change in acquirer profitability following the merger of 233 UK 
companies between 1964 and 1971 and concluded that mergers in his sample depict decline 
in profitability. Return on asset (ROA) has been taken as a measure of profitability. Nearly 
two-third of the acquirers report profitability below industry average.  Supporting evidence of 
acquirer profitability being below industry average has been found by Peer (1980) & Ryden 
and Ed berg (1980) 
Muller (1980) made a rich cross-border comparison of effects of mergers across seven 
nations namely Belgium, France, German, Netherland, UK, US and Sweden. The research 
examined theories on change in leverage, profitability, size and risk. Three different measures 
of profitability were chosen (i) ROA (Return on assets calculated as Profit Before Interest and 
Taxes (PBIT) divided by assets) (ii) ROE (Return on equity computed as Profit after tax 
(PAT) divided by equity (iii) Net profit Ratio measured as net profit divided by sales. 
Consistent with the findings of Meek, Muller also finds deteriorating profitability in post-
merger period though the results were not significant. Muller remarks that if he was asked to 
draw a generalization, it would be that mergers have modest effects on profitability whether 
up or down in three to five years subsequent to merger.   
Contrary to the findings of Muller (1980) and Meek (1977) Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1980) 
deduce that post-merger profitability of 290 UK mergers for the period of 1967-69 improved 
significantly at 5% level of significance. Similar evidence was found by Kumps and 
Wtterwulghe (1980) on 40 Belgium mergers. However the change in profitability is 
statistically insignificant in this study. 
Later in 1987 Ravenscroft and Scherer explored the profitability of 471 target firms between 
1950 and 1977. The freshness of this study lies in the special data-base used which permitted 
a better definition of control groups, and a cautious assessment of assets values and the 
impact of choice of accounting method. ROA is considered as a measure of profitability. 
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They report that profitability of acquirers is lower than the control groups. The major 
GUDZEDFNRIWKHVWXG\DVTXRWHGE\%UXQHULV³WKHFRPSDULVRQLQSRVW-merger years is 
XQGHUPLQHGE\PLVDOLJQPHQWZLWKWKHPHUJHU\HDU´ 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) examined fifty largest Mergers and Acquisitions of US 
EHWZHHQ  DQG  +H EHQFKPDUNHG LQGXVWU\ SHUIRUPDQFH WR WHVW DFTXLUHU¶V
performance. He finds that asset productivity of the merged firms improved significantly 
following acquisition and this resulted into higher cash-flow returns. Moreover their capital 
expenditure and R&D rates were constant signifying that this improvement in performance 
was not at the cost of investment made in business. But later Gosh (2001) showed that the 
industry adjustment of raw ROE used by Healy (1992) may produce estimates that are 
positively biased. Powell and Stark (2005) argued that this bias can be reduced if instead of 
industry averages, performance or size benchmarks are used. 
Dickerson et al (1997) studies the sample of 2941 acquisitions of UK between 1948 and 
1977. The profitability of acquisitions is investigated in two ways Firstly if there is a 
permanent shift in profitability after the first acquisition and secondly if there is difference 
returns for acquisition growth and internal growth. They use ROA as a measure of 
profitability. Their results show that acquisitions have negative impact on performance in 
short run as well as in long run.  Furthermore it is estimated that profitability decreases by 
2.04% per annum in the post-merger period and it reduce by 2.03% with every acquisition. 
Andrade et al (2001) tested post-acquisition performance of US mergers between 1973 and 
1998. They found the operating margins, calculated as cash flows divided by sales, improved 
as compared to industry benchmark. They concluded that the combined operating 
performance of target and the acquirer was greater than their peers in pre-merger period and 
increased marginally in post-merger period. They have also called the studies measuring 
operating performance problematic.  
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Bild et al. (2005) reported ROE of -1.47 to 0.99% in -3 to -1 years and 17.24 to 21.50% for 
the years 0 to +3.  Mishra and Chandra, (2010) analyses the post-merger performance of 52 
listed Indian pharmaceutical companies between 2001 and 2008. They have used two 
alternative measures of performance namely PBIT to sales and PAT to sales and found that 
mergers had no significant influence on the long-run performance of the firms possibly due to 
new entrants in the market or resultant X-inefficiencies. 
Researcher Period  No of cases Performance 
measure 
country Results 
Meeks (1977) 
 
1964- 71 233 ROA UK Report decline in 
profitability. Nearly two-third 
of the mergers had 
profitability below industry 
average 
Peer (1980) 
 
1962-73 29 
 
 
ROE Netherland Decline in ROE reported in 
post-merger period. 
Muller (1980) 1962-72 287 ROA 
ROE 
NP Ratio 
UK, US, 
Sweden, 
Netherland
s, 
German, 
France, 
Belgium 
Deteriorating performance is 
reported . US firms were 
found to be less profitable 
when compared to other 
firms although the results 
were not significant. 
Cosh, Hughes 
and Singh (1980) 
1967-69 290 
 
 
ROA UK They reported statistically 
significant improvement in 
profitability in post-merger 
period.  
Ravenscroft and 
Scherer (1987) 
1950-77 471 
 
ROA US A decline in ROA of about 
0.5% per year was deduced 
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Healy, Palepu, 
and Ruback 
(1992) 
1979-84 50 Operating cash 
flows 
US They conclude that M&A is a 
zero NPV activity and thus 
do not lead to any value 
enhancement. 
Dickerson et al 
(1997) 
1948-77 2941 
 
 
ROA UK Deteriorating performance in 
post merger period by 2.04% 
p.a. is reported.  
Andrade et al 
(2001) 
1973-98 4300 
 
 
Cash-
flows/sales 
US Improvement in operating 
margins are reported as 
compared to industry 
benchmarks. 
Gosh (2001) 1981±
1995 
315 
 
ROA US No change in ROA is found 
but Operating cash flow 
change significantly if 
acquisition is made with 
cash. 
Rahman and 
Limmack 
(2004) 
1988±92 94 Operating 
performance 
(see results) 
Malaysia Return is calculated as pre-
tax operating cash-flow 
returns on assets.  The 
performance improved in 
post-merger period. 
Lu (2004) 1978±96 592 ROA 
ROE 
US Significant Negative impact 
has been found on ROA and 
ROE  
Bild et al. (2005) 1985-96 303 
 
 
ROE UK Post-merger profitability 
improved significantly.  
Mishra and 
Chandra (2010) 
2001-08 52 
 
 
PBIT/sales, 
PAT/sales 
India Mergers do not influence the 
profitability in long run  
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However no common conclusion can be drawn from the studies using accounting data as the 
methods used for measuring performance are varied and moreover the accounting methods 
used in different countries and by different firms are not consistent. But no clear evidence of 
performance being enhanced by mergers has been reported. It will still be worth emphasising 
that Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1989) employed both earning based and cash-flow based 
operating performance measures and showed that both methods produced contradictory 
results. Earning based measures showed deteriorating post-merger profitability while cash-
flow measures indicated post-merger gains.   
Recently a few studies have tried to measure performance by both the methods discussed 
above and as these studies are trying to answer the same question: Are mergers value-
enhancing?  the results are expected to be broadly consistent However Caves 1989 remarks 
that according to event studies a bundle of gains accrue to target shareholders and acquirers 
barely earn anything, making the net economic effect of merger positive  while accounting 
studies have generally found negative results signifying that the two studies  give conflicting 
results which is rather disturbing.  
 
2.3.3 Productivity: 
Empirical evidence on event studies suggests that acquisitions have a net positive impact on 
shareholders wealth. But are these gains merely private gains or do they accrue to the entire 
society? Shleifer and  Summers (1989) argue that an increase in share price linked with 
mergers, is simply a transfer of wealth from some stakeholders (e.g. employees, government) 
to others (shareholders) due to frequent possibilities of events such as laying off workers, or 
gaining tax advantages by the merged company. While an opposing view claims that mergers 
engender gains to the society as the efficiency of combined firms increase owing to effects 
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like synergy. The validity of these two contradictory views can be tested by seeing if mergers 
essentially lead to increase in production efficiency of the firm. The firm can increase 
production efficiency in three ways (i) by achieving economies of scale (ii) by producing 
more output with the same level of inputs or (iii) by changing input-output mix to be more 
cost and revenue efficient. Various studies have tried to analyse the increase such efficiencies 
by measuring Total Factor productivity (TFP) (Lichtenberg et al, (1987); Maksimovic and 
Phillips, (2001); McGuckin et al, (1995); Harris et al, (2005)) or by estimating production, 
cost and profit efficiencies through frontier analysis (Sharkas et al, (2008); Lang et al, (1999); 
Chunyan Yu, (2008)).  
Lichtenberg et al (1987) and McGukin and Nguyen (1995) advocate productivity to be a 
better measure of performance over those used by accounting studies and event studies for 
analysing the effects of mergers. This is because productivity is a ratio of output(s) to input(s) 
of the firm and thus assists in measuring efficiency at production level.   
Lichtenberg et al (1987) measured productivity at plant level for 20493 manufacturing plants 
of 5700 US firms from 1972 to 1981 and was one of the initial studies to measure economic 
efficiency by way of productivity. He measured efficiency gains with the help of TFP growth. 
They concluded that the TFP growth was 0.5% higher for plants involved in ownership 
changes. Consistent with the matching theory, they found that ownership change is more 
likely for less efficient plants and this productivity gap is eliminated in around seven years 
after the change of ownership. But critics claim that these results may be due to sampling bias 
as the plants which were shut down and did not exist for the entire period of study were 
dropped from the sample. Later McGukin commented that model used by Lichtenberg et al 
was too restrictive. 
McGukin et al (1995) studied productivity changes before and after acquisitions of 28,294 
plants for a period of 1977 to 1987 of US food producing industry. TFP and RLP (Relative 
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Labour Productivity measured as Ratio of plant labour productivity to industry labour 
productivity) has been used to measure changes in productivity. Contrary to Lichtenberg et al 
(1987) McGukin et al deduce that plants with high productivity are prone to ownership 
change. However, size of the plant also matters. In the sense that, more often than not ,large 
plants with inefficiency are more likely to be acquired than shut-down. Secondly, they also 
show that productivity improves with change in ownership with a mention about the sample 
bias which may have influenced the results. 
+DUULV HW DO HVWDEOLVK WKH7)3RI8.PDQXIDFWXULQJHVWDEOLVKPHQWV¶SUH DQG
post management buy-outs (MBOs). They finds similar evidence as that of Lichtenberg et al 
(1987) suggesting that less-efficient plants are readily a target and efficiency increases after 
the acquisition. They also report that agency costs decrease after MBOs. 
Schoar (2002) analyses 245,006 plants of 20,366 US manufacturing firms and supports the 
conclusions drawn by previous studies about increase in productivity of the acquired plants 
Nonetheless he also shows that the productivity of the incumbent plants decrease by 2% and 
H[SODLQVWKLVGHFOLQHLQSURGXFWLYLW\DVDµQHZWR\HIIHFW¶VHH6FKRDUS7KRXJK
the increase in productivity is about 3% as opposed to a decrease of 2% he claims that the 
total productivity of the firm becomes negative as there are too many incumbent plants. 
Yeh and Hoshino (2001) have used productivity measures and operating performance 
measures to analyse mergers and acquisitions of 86 Japanese acquisitions between 1970 and 
1994. They deduced that Japanese mergers did not create any value in terms of production 
efficiency and led to deterioration of operating performance. The measure TE by Total 
productivity Factor and operating performance with the help of ROA, ROE and growth rate 
of sales and employees. Yeh and Hoshino (2009) rationalizes these results by arguing that 
mergers are undertaken as a defensive approach in Japan. They are means of restructuring 
during slack and to survive tough competition during hard times.  
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Most of the studies mentioned above are on manufacturing firms. A lot of studies have also 
focused on banking sector and have preferred frontier techniques over Total Factor 
Productivity used by precious studies. A few such studies are described below. 
Lang et al (1999) analyses 283 mergers of German banks for a period of 1989 to 1997. They 
have used a cost frontier to derive their results. They show that scale and scope efficiencies 
can be enhanced through mergers if part of former branch network is closed. For post-merger 
phase their study shows no efficiency gains for merged firms but indicate levelling off of 
differences of merged units.  
Cuesta et al (2001) investigated the difference in level of technical efficiency for merged and 
non-merged Spanish banks with the help of Stochastic output distance function. The period of 
study ranges from 1985 to 1998. They derive that there are significant differences in technical 
efficiencies of merged and non-merged firms not only in levels but also in time. And they 
conclude that merged firms seem to be more efficient than non-merged firms.  
Sharkas et al (2008) reviewed profit and cost efficiencies of 1552 US bank mergers for a 
period of 1985-2002. He used Stochastic Frontier Analysis (explained in section3.2) and non-
parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (refer section 3.2) to assess the production structure 
of non-merged and merged banks. His results indicate that mergers enhance cost and profit 
efficiencies of the bank. Costs of Merged banks are lower than non-merged banks because of 
technical and allocative efficiency.  
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1. Methodology:  
As stated earlier, some studies have compared results of event studies and accounting studies   
with contradictory conclusions. But no study to the best of my knowledge has attempted to 
analyse the performance of mergers and acquisitions using accounting measures and Frontier 
techniques.  
Moreover very few studies have made comparison of results across various accounting 
measures of performance (e.g. Muller 1980). This study attempts to analyse the outcome(s) of 
M&A using different accounting and productivity measures of performance like Ratio of 
Profit before Interest and tax to sales (PBIT/Sales), Profit after tax to Sales ratio (PAT/Sales) 
commonly known as net profit ratio, Return on assets (ROA) and Technical Efficiency 
calculated with the help of Stochastic Frontier Analysis Approach. While the last one 
captures change in productivity of mergers, others form a part of accounting measures of 
performance. The vital purpose to encompass four measures of performance and two 
methodologies is to check the robustness of results.   
3.1 Empirical Framework: 
7KLVVWXG\IRFXVHVRQDQDO\VLVRISDQHOGDWD$SDQHOGDWDPRGHOIRUILUPL¶VSURILWDELOLW\IRU
time period t is stated below: 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ௡ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧        for i  «N; t  «T                                                            3.1a 
Xit = [X1it«;Nit] states a vector of independent variables. These variables are discussed later 
LQ WKH VWXG\ ȕ UHSRUWV WKH LQGLYLGXDO FRHIILFLHQWV RI ;it. ୧୲Embodies various measures of 
performance (PBIT/Sales, PAT/sales, ROA and TE) and ࢿit represents the error term. For a 
panel data framework the error term ࢿit may differ across N individual firms (individual 
effects) as well as across T time periods (Time effects).
  
ߝ௜௧ ൌ ݑ௜௧ ൅ ௜݂ ൅ ߟ௧  
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ݑ௜௧ is the randomly distributed term, ௜݂ is the time invariant individual effects and ߟ௧ represents time 
effects (Lee, 2009). +RZHYHU WKH ZD\ HUURU WHUP¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ ZLOO FKDQJH IURP PRGHO WR
model so more on it will be discussed later.  
A structural conduct performance framework used by Mishra and Chandra (2010) is used in 
this paper. Here dual causalities between structure and conduct, structure and performance & 
conduct and performance are expected. The independent variables chosen in the research 
include size of a firm, growth rate, market share, research and development intensity (R&D 
intensity), Bad debt intensity, Advertisement intensity, Capital intensity and merger. The 
above equation can now be restated as below: 
݌݁ݎ ௜݂௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵݏ݅ݖ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܴƬܦ݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܥܽ݌݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚସܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௧ ൅ ߚହ݉݇ݐݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜௧ ൅ߚ଻ܤܦ݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܣ݀ݒ݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚଽܯ݁ݎ݃ ௜݁௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧                                                                 3.1b 
In the above equation ݌݁ݎ ௜݂௧ , ݏ݅ݖ݁௜௧  ܴƬܦ݅݊ݐ௜௧ , ܥܽ݌݅݊ݐ௜௧ , ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௧ , ݉݇ݐݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜௧ ,ܤܦ݅݊ݐ௜௧ , ܣ݀ݒ݅݊ݐ௜௧  and ܯ݁ݎ݃݁௜௧  stands for performance measures, firm size, Research and 
Development intensity, Capital intensity, Firm growth, Market share of the firm, Bad debt 
intensity, advertisement intensity and merger and acquisition dummy respectively. Firm size 
and market share signify structural aspects of the market. Merge, R&D intensity, Bad debt 
intensity, advertisement intensity and capital intensity capture firms conduct and performance 
is represented by the four measures specified above (PBIT/sales, PAT/sales, ROA and TE). 
Variables like size square, leverage, export intensity and import intensity were consistently 
displaying insignificance across various measures and methods so they were dropped from 
the model.   
Firstly for application of the model 3.1b we need to calculate the technical efficiency scores 
of the firms (the fourth measure of Performance) with the help of Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA). So let us understand what SFA is and how to compute technical efficiencies.  
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3.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis: 
Traditionally, econometricians assumed that producers operate on the theoretically developed 
production, cost and profit functions by efficient allocation of inputs, save the randomly 
distributed error. However, empirical evidences suggest that all producers are not successful 
in solving the optimization problem which leads to inefficiency. To put it differently all 
producers are not able to use minimum inputs to produce the required output given the 
technology or they are not technically efficient. In order to take these inefficiencies into 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQLWLVGHVLUDEOHWRPRYHIURPIXQFWLRQVWRIURQWLHUV³7KXVDSURGXFWLRQIURQWLHU
characterizes the minimum input bundle required to produce various outputs, or the 
maximum output producible with various input bundle and given technology. Producers 
operating on the frontier are labelled technically efficient and those operating below their 
production frontiers are said to be technLFDOO\LQHIILFLHQW´.XPEKDNDU	/RYHOO p.3). 
Similar frontier can be constructed for cost, revenue and profit as well.  
When we reformulate from function to frontier, the error term is the composed error term 
made up of symmetrically distributed white noise and the new one-sided inefficiency 
element. The one-sided inefficiency is because the firms are expected to operate on or below 
the production/profit/revenue frontier and on or above the cost frontier except the case of 
exceptionally good operating environment. The method with composite error term came to be 
known as stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). 
 The roots of development of SFA were laid in early 1950s by Koopmans (1951), Debreu 
(1951) and Shephard (1953). Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Meeusen and Van Den 
Broeck (1977) and Battese and Corra (1977) developed a Stochastic Frontier Model 
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ 7KLV PRGHO KHOSV RQH WR HVWLPDWH HDFK ILUP¶V GLYHUJHQFH IURP WKH EHVW
practice firm. The model may be written as:  
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ݂ሺ ௜ܺ௧ ǡ ܼ௜ሻ ൅ ݒ௜௧ േ ݑ௜௧ ൌ ߚᇱ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ Ɋᇱܼ௜ ൅ ݒ௜௧ േ ݑ௜௧                         3.2a 
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The sign of ݑ௜௧ GHSHQGVRQZKHWKHULW¶VDFRVWSRVLWLYHRUSURGXFWLRQQHJDWLYHIURQWLHU 
A Cobb-Douglas Production function can be written as follows:  
݈݊ ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅෍ߚ௡݈݊ܺ௡௜௧ே௡ୀଵ ൅ݒ௜௧ െ ݑ௜௧  ?Ǥ ?  ܾ
Where ௜ܻ  is the output, ܺ௡௜௧  are the n number of inputs used. ݒ௜  Refers to the white noise 
commonly known as idiosyncratic error and ݑ௜ is the one-sided inefficiency term mentioned 
above. There have been many distributional assumptions of this one-sided inefficiency term 
postulated by different people.   
ݑ௜ ?݅݅݀ܰାሺ ?ǡ ߪ௨ଶሻ    (half-normal distribution) 
ݑ௜ ?݅ ݅݀ܰାሺɊǡ ߪ௨ଶሻ   (truncated normal) 
ݑ௜ ?݅݅݀ܩሺߣǡ  ?ሻ         (exponential with mean ߣ) 
ݑ௜ ?݅݅݀ܩሺߣǡ݉ሻ        (gamma with mean ߣ and degrees of freedom m) 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) developed the half-normal distribution model. The 
truncated normal model was developed by Stevensen (1980). The gamma model was 
developed by Greene (1990). Using any of these distributional assumptions does not make a 
significant difference in the results. Generally truncated normal distribution is preferred. 
Other than Stochastic frontier analysis, Data Envelopment Analysis is a widely used method 
for establishing frontiers. It is a non-parametric method as opposed to SFA. The model used 
in DEA is deterministic and thus does not include the white noise term. All the differences 
are assumed to be due to inefficiencies.  
Cobb-Douglas production function mentioned in equation (3.2b) is the simplest model but 
owing to its limitations like the model is restrictive and its inability to capture non-linear 
changes in the model, a more complicated four-input translog Production Function is used to 
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compute technical efficiency scores. The translog function in terms of logarithms can be 
written as follows:  
ܮ݊ܳ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚ௅ܮ݊ܮ ൅ ߚ௄ܮ݊ܭ ൅ ߚோܮܴ݊ ൅ߚாܮ݊ܧ ൅  ?Ǥ ?ߚ௅௅ܮ݊ܮଶ ൅  ?Ǥ ?ߚ௄௄ܮ݊ܭଶ ൅  ?Ǥ ?ߚாாܮ݊ܧଶ ൅ ?Ǥ ?ߚோோܮܴ݊ଶ ൅ ߚ௅௄ܮ݊ܮܮ݊ܭ ൅ ߚோாܮܴ݊ܮ݊ܧ ൅ ߚ௅ோܮ݊ܮܮܴ݊ ൅ ߚ௅ாܮ݊ܮܮ݊ܧ ൅ ߚ௄ோܮ݊ܭܮܴ݊ ൅ߚா௄ܮ݊ܧܮ݊ܭ ൅ݒ௜௧ െ ݑ௜௧                                                                                                                             3.2c 
Here Q stands for outputs, L stands for labour inputs, K represents capital inputs, R indicates 
raw materials inputs and E denotes energy inputs. A time varying model is used for 
generation of results. After estimating this equation inefficiency scores are generated. After 
getting the inefficiencies post estimation in Stata gives scores of technical efficiency by 
standardizing it with maximum efficiency existing.   
3.3 Estimation Techniques 
3.3.1 Ordinary Least Square Technique: 
The model specified in section 3.1 will first be estimated with the help of Ordinary Least 
Square method (OLS) or Polled model. This is the simplest approach as it disregards the time 
and space dimensions included in panel data. To put it differently it does not take individual 
firm heterogeneity into consideration. So the error term specified in equation 3.1a (ࢿit) 
symbolizes a randomly distributed white noise. Three results are derived with the help of this 
method. Firstly a static model of form mentioned in equation 3.1b is applied (i.e. lagged 
profit variable is not included). Secondly as will be specified in the explanation of variables 
(next section), reasonable evidence has been found regarding dynamics in profits of Indian 
companies. Hence In order to check the reliability of this assumption various performance 
measures are regressed against lagged performance. Such approach is adopted by Lee (2009) 
in his paper.  The equation estimated here will be of following form: 
݌݁ݎ ௜݂௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚ଴݌݁ݎ ௜݂ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧                                                                                        3.3.1a 
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Lastly a dynamic model is used to deduce necessary results. This method is again motivated 
by Lee (2009).  The following equation describes this approach 
݌݁ݎ ௜݂௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚ଴݌݁ݎ ௜݂ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵݏ݅ݖ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܴƬܦ݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܥܽ݌݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚସܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௧ ൅ߚହ݉݇ݐݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܤܦ݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܣ݀ݒ݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚଽܯ݁ݎ݃݁௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧                                      3.3.1b 
3.3.2 Panel data Techniques: 
The biggest shortcoming of OLS is its incapability to take individual firm heterogeneity into 
account. Each firm is different in various aspects. To list a few of them may include 
managerial skill and ability, geographical location, ownership differences (e.g. State owned) 
etc. It is a known fact that applying OLS to panel data gives distorted outcomes. So we move 
on to the Random effects model widely talked about in the literature.  
Random Effects Model: 
Random effects model assumes that the individual effects and error term are uncorrelated. 
The model used here looks very similar to the one mentioned in 3.1b.  
The error term here has 2 components one is the white noise (ݑ௜௧ሻ DQGWKHRWKHULVWKHILUP¶V
individual effects ሺ݂݅ሻ . This method does not compromis e with the assumption of 
independent variables and error term being uncorrelated as the individual effects are assumed 
to be uncorrelated with independent variables. A Breusch Pagan Test is conducted to test the 
presence of heterogeneity in the data. This test assists us to make a choice between pooled 
model and Random effects model. The null hypothesis of the test is ߪ௙ ൌ  ?). It uses chi-
square statistic and if LM value calculated > chi square value in the table then null hypothesis 
is rejected. In such a case REM is appropriate. 
It should be noted here that even fixed effects model could also have been used for panel data 
but the following paragraph describes the problem encountered in an attempt to use this 
model.  
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Fixed effects model assumes the individual effects to be correlated with the independent 
variables. The fixed effects model can assume the following form. 
݌݁ݎ ௜݂௧ ൌ ߙ଴൅ߚଵݏ݅ݖ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܴƬܦ݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܥܽ݌݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚସܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜௧ ൅ ߚହ݉݇ݐݏ݄ܽݎ݁௜௧൅ ߚ଻ܤܦ݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܣ݀ݒ݅݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߚଽܯ݁ݎ݃݁௜௧ ൅ ௜݂ ൅ ݑ௜௧ 
 
Here ௜݂  VWDQGVIRUWLPHLQYDULDQWILUP¶VLQGLYLGXDOHIIHFWV$QGݑ௜௧ is the randomly distributed 
error term. These two are separated because of the assumption of ௜݂ being correlated to ݑ௜௧ Ǥ 
The results of Fixed Effects Model can be generated in 2 ways either by using Least Square 
Dummy Variable approach which assigns dummies to all the firms present in the data or by 
using within estimator which gets rid of all the individual effects and dummies from the 
model. A within estimator could not be used owing to the presence of dummy variable 
(merger) in the analysis. And the LSDV model can be argued to be very expensive in terms 
of degree of freedom (df) when the number of cross-sectional units is very large. Effort to run 
LSDV was futile due to huge number of cross-sectional units dealt with in this data. So I 
decided to use Random Effects model.  
3.3.3  Instrumental Variable  GMM estimation technique: 
The assumption of independent variables and error terms being uncorrelated is crucial. All 
the models used previously were based on the supposition of strict exogeneity of independent 
variables (i.e. no correlation between error term and independent variable). Strict exogeneity 
rules out any reactions from current or past shocks to current values of the variables. But 
there are a few models where this assumption is untenable. When correlation is observed 
between error term and independent variable the variable is said to be endogenous i.e. 
³GHWHUPLQHG ZLWKLQ WKH V\VWHP´ :KHQ DW OHDVW RQH RI WKH YDULDEOHV LV HQGRJHQRXV ZH DUH
IDFHGZLWKµHQGRJHQHLW\SUREOHP¶The least square estimates are biased and inconsistent in 
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presence of endogenous variables.  In such a situation there is an alternative method of 
estimation available the method of instrumental variable.  
Under this technique the endogenous variable is instrumented by other variable or group of 
variables which are highly correlated with the independent variable but are uncorrelated with 
the error term. In the model being used here variable growth is said to be endogenous as 
companies with high growth rate tend to have high profitability due to internal funds 
available to them and vice cersa. My attention to this endogeneity problem was drawn by the 
work of Dickerson et al (1997) who has instrumented growth in his research with lagged 
growth variable. The same approach is used in this paper.  
4 Data Source, Variables and Summary Statistics 
4.1 Data 
I am working on the data of Indian Manufacturing Industries obtained from Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy Pvt. Ltd. (CMIE) Mumbai. CMIE has built the largest source on 
Indian economy and companies. Eight manufacturing industries included in my research are 
listed in the table below with their relevant industry codes: 
Table 5: list of industries included in the research 
Industry code Industry 
Code 01 Agriculture, Hunting and forestry 
Code 20 Manufacture of wood and products of wood 
Code 24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
Code 25 Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic products 
Code 26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
Code 31 Manufacture of electrical Machinery and apparatus 
Code 40 Electricity, gas and water supply 
Code 45 Construction 
 
Page | 45 
 
The research period under investigation is from 1988 to 2008. Total number of companies 
researched is 4004. This includes 239 cases of mergers over the years. A total of 34421 
observations are analysed. The panel considered is unbalanced as all the firms included were 
not present in the sample for entire period because of late entry or attrition. Each merged firm 
is treated as a new entry in the data.  
4.2 Definition of Variables: 
The following section defines the variables included in production function, Performance 
measures that is the dependent variables of SCP equation specified in section 3.1 and 
independent or explanatory variables derived from section 3.1.  
4.2.1 Variables for production: 
The translog production function described in equation 3.2c contains the following variables 
for the purpose of research. Output is defined as log of sales of goods. Labour is expressed as 
log of total compensation paid to the employees. Capital is defined as log of fixed assets of 
the firm. Materials capture the log of raw materials used in the company and log of power 
fuel and capital depicts energy. All these variables are deflated by appropriate index before 
taking their logs. For instance WPI manufacturing index is used to deflate outputs and capital, 
Energy is deflated by WPI fuel, WPI primary and CPI are used to deflate raw materials and 
labour respectively.      
4.2.2 Performance measures: 
The dependent variables measuring the performance of the firm chosen in this research are: 
Profit Before Interest and tax to sales (PBIT/Sales):  
As indicated this variable can be computed as the ratio of Profit before Interest and tax to 
sales.  This variable is included by Mishra and Chandra (2010) in his study of Indian 
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pharmaceutical Industry. PBIT is necessary to be considered to keep the results free from any 
biases arising due to difference in tax laws existing in India for different firms or industries 
owing to government subsidies.  For instance agricultural income is exempt from taxes 
according to section 10 of Indian Income tax Act 1961 (Ahuja et al, 2010; [1]). Companies 
can also avail deductions or exemptions if they are established in certain locations or 
industries for initial few years for example under section 80JA power units are exempt from 
tax for 10 consecutive years from initial 15 years. Furthermore PBIT aids us to keep the 
results free from any prejudices arising due to difference in capital structures of a company as 
Interest expenses are not taken into consideration. 
Net profit Ratio (PAT/Sales) : 
In addition to the measure considered above it would be necessary to consider the Net profit 
ratio calculated by way of profit after tax divided by sales as this plays a key role in deciding 
the performance of the company. It is absolutely important to know the companies earning 
available to the shareholders after all the expenses are deducted and provisions for taxes are 
made. This measure is used by Muller (1980) and Mishra and Chandra (2010).   
Return on assets (ROA): 
Return on assets (ROA) is the most frequently used measure of performance in the 
acquisition literature (e.g. see Meeks, 1977; Mueller, 1980; Ravenscroft et al 1987; Dickerson 
et al, 1997 Gschwandtner, 2005 and Goddard et al, 2006). It indicates how efficiently the 
assets of a company are utilized and is computes as PBIT to assets. To put it differently it 
measures how much the company reaps for the investments made in the business.  
Technical Efficiency (TE): 
Technical efficiency is for measuring the changes in productivity of a company. The 
computation of Technical efficiency can be seen in section ().  It always lies between 0 and 1. 
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The most efficient company that lies on the frontier will have its technical efficiency score 
close to 1. A technical efficiency score of .80 suggests that the company is working at an 
efficiency level of 80% and there is still a scope of improvement.  
4.2.3 Independent variables: 
 Firm size: 
Empirical literature has hypothesized firm size to have a positive relationship with profits 
(Hall and Weis, 1967; Scherer, 1973; Majumdar, 1977; Contractor, Kumar and Kundu, 2007; 
Lee, 2009). This is because benefits like scale economies and other efficiencies accrue to 
large firms (Shephered, 1972; Scherer 1973). However Caves and Porter (1977) and Porter 
(1979) observe the firm size and profit relationship may differ across industries. Amato and 
Amato argue that the profitability-firm size relationship does not hold for retail industries. 
However it should be mentioned here that the relationship between firm size and Technical 
efficiency (one of the measure of performance used in the study) is ambiguous. Aggrey et al 
(2010) in his study of African manufacturing firms has found negative relationship between 
Technical efficiency and firm size.  
Researchers have measured firm size in different ways e.g. Geroski (1998) takes it as log of 
total sales while Chen et al mentions log of total employees as a way to quantify size but the 
most prominent method supported by huge literature is log value of total assets (Amato and 
Amato, 2004; Lee 2009; Chandra 2010). The effect on firm profits if different measures of 
size are used is explained by Smyth et al (1975). In order to control for inflation nominal 
value of assets is deflated by appropriate index. Other variables except size are in form of 
ratios so such deflation is not needed there.  
 Size square: 
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It has been noticed by various researchers that size has a non-linear relationship with profits 
(Porter, 1985; Amato and Amato, 2004; Lee, 2009). To capture this non-linearity a size 
square term is added. This term signifies that size has a diminishing marginal effect on 
profits. As observed by Ratchford and Stoops 1998, at higher end of size distribution 
diseconomies to scale occur. If this non-linear relationship is to be believed than size square 
should have a negative relationship with profitability with significant coefficient. 
Nevertheless after running various models on different measures of performance this variable 
was found to be consistently insignificant so this variable was dropped from the research 
later.   
Market share: 
Ravenscraft (1983) and Amato and Wilder (1985) find market share to be the crucial factor 
influencing the performance of the firm.. Ravenscraft (1983) relates market share to firm 
efficiency while Shepherd (1973) interprets it as a source of market power. Nonetheless 
Szymanski et al (1993) examine the results of 76 studies describing the relationship between 
market share and profitability and agrees with neither efficiency hypothesis nor market power 
hypothesis. Theory of Industrial Economics suggests a positive relationship between market 
share and profitability. But the relationship between the two variables is not so 
straightforward. A U-shaped relationship between these two variables has been noticed by 
Fenny and Rogers (1999).  Moreover it can be argued that higher market share may 
encourage entry of new firms or increase X-inefficiencies of the existing ones leading to 
market share having no significant impact on profitability. Supporting evidence has been 
found by McDonald (1999).  Market share in this study has been measured as a ratio of 
domestic sales of a firm to total industrial sales (Lee 2009). Sales through exports are 
deducted from actual sales to get domestic sales. Although Market share is repeatedly used as 
a proxy for market power by large no of researches Amato and Wilder (1985), Mueller 
(1990), Amato and Amato (2004) find strong evidence for other variables like Research and 
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Development intensity, advertisement intensity and capital intensity to have an effect on 
market power. So these variables are also included in the model. 
R&D intensity: 
Sustained innovations of any kind (process or product) acts as an entry barrier (Muller, 1990) 
and thus enhances profits of a company in long run (Cefis, 1998).  Nevertheless these extra 
profits might vanish in absence of proper regulations due to competitors imitating the 
product. In such circumstances Mishra and Chandra (2010) claim that R&D intensity has a 
negative relationship with profits. Lagged R&D intensity is included in the model by Mishra 
and Chandra (2010) in anticipation of it having lagged relationship with profits, while Lee 
2008 has not used lagged variable. After conducting various tests on data I found R&D 
intensity was more suitable for my data over lagged R&D intensity. Evidence of this is 
provided in the Appendix tables I, J, K, L. 
Advertisement intensity:  
As pointed out earlier strong evidence has been found by Amato and Wilder (1985), Mueller 
(1990) & Amato and Amato (2004) of advertisement intensity being a source of market 
SRZHUDQGDFWLQJDVDQ HQWU\EDUULHU$GYHUWLVLQJ LQWHQVLW\ UHIOHFWVD ILUP¶VFRPPitment to 
marketing strategies and functions as a representative for product differentiation from those 
of competitors (Erickson & Jacobson, 1992). Ambler (2003) views advertisement expenditure 
as investment as it may generate substantial paybacks. Hence the proposed relationship 
between advertising expenditure and Profitability should be positive. Nevertheless Delios and 
Beamish (2001) discovered a negative relationship between advertisement expenditure and 
profitability. Chen et al (2009) proves through his results that advertisement expenditure has 
a U-shaped relationship with profitability. In this research the effects of advertisement on 
profitability are analysed by taking ratio of advertisement expenditure to sales. This saves one 
from the problems of deflating the value by an appropriate index. As a negative though not 
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significant relationship was found in this research the existence of U-shape relationship 
proposed by Chen et al (2009) was examined but no such evidences were found. A sample of 
this examination is shown in appendix.  
 
Capital intensity:  
Capital intensity measures the amount of fixed capital present in comparison with other 
factors of production. Under normal circumstances capital intensity is hypothesized to have a 
positive relationship with performance as it makes other factors of production (especially 
labour) more effective.  
 
Bad debt intensity: 
The financial conditions of the firm can be analysed by using Bad debt intensity as an 
independent variable. This variable is proposed to have a negative relationship with profits as 
a large proportion of bad debt proves to be an hindrance to firm profitability. This variable 
was first used by Amato and Amato (2004) in his study and later used by J.Lee (2009). This 
variable is the ratio of Bad debt of a company to sales. This variable has been found to have a 
significant impact on profitability by researchers and thus is included in the study.  
Growth:   
Growth, as one of the determining factors of profitability has received considerable attention 
in both theory and literature. Growth is linked with profit maximization and achievement of 
optimal firm size. Growth is believed to have positive relationship with profits (Dickerson et 
al, 1997; Lee, 2009). However Penrose (1959) finds that there is a constraint to growth in any 
period as if the firm grows too fast the management may not be able to manage growth 
efficiently. Marris 1964 argues that profit maximization may be sacrificed for growth as 
growth brings benefits like power, prestige, huge salaries to management. Sales growth is 
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used as a proxy for growth. Dickerson et al (1997) have instrumented growth with its lagged 
variable claiming it to be endogenous variable.  
Mergers and acquisitions: 
It is commonly held that mergers and acquisitions are undertaken to gain synergy by reducing 
costs (Porter, 1985; Shelton, 1988) or for increasing market power (Steiner, 1975; Chatterjee, 
 6R PHUJHUV DQG DFTXLVLWLRQV PD\ EH H[SHFWHG WR KDYH SRVLWLYH LPSDFW RQ ILUP¶V
profitability. But it has been argued that monopoly power may lead to X-inefficiency and 
thus does not improve financial performance. To check the effect of mergers and acquisition 
Indian companies it has been taken as a dummy variable (1 for merged firms and 0 for non-
merged). 
Dynamics in profit:  
Neoclassical economists are of an opinion that in a freely functioning market, profit 
differentials erode over time due to entry and exit of firms. But empirical evidence reveals 
conflicting results. Since Mueller (1977, 1986) various studies have tried to examine 
dynamics of profits and have found modest (Muller 1990) or substantial (Kessides, 1990) 
persistence over years.  
Lee (2009) has used structure conduct performance measure on US firms (the one used in this 
study) and has found lagged profit variable to be significant. But persistence in profits differs 
with the country in consideration e.g. Geroski et al notes that contrary to companies in France 
and Germany UK company profits, whether below or above average, persist permanently. So 
it would be helpful to see if persistence in profits is true for Indian companies.  
Kambhampati (1995) remarked that in developing countries like India, due to institutional 
and strategic barriers, entry and exit is restrictive, resulting into remarkable persistence in 
profits. He examined 42 Indian industries and found persistence coefficient above 0.6 for 25 
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industries. But he analyses data form 1970 to 1985 and his results may due to licencing and 
other policies existing in India during that period which can act as a hindrance to entries. 
Nevertheless Pawaskar (2001) also found supporting evidence when analysing mergers and 
acquisitions of Indian companies between 1992 and 1995 which indicates that persistence in 
profits exists for Indian companies.  Inspite of these evidences Mishra and Chandra (2010) 
did not include lagged profit variable in the structure conduct performance (SCP) model used 
to analyse mergers and acquisitions of Pharmaceutical industry.  
4.3 Summary statistics  
I start my research by doing some preliminary analysis of the data gathered. Table 6 and 
Table 7  depict the summary statistics of independent variables and dependent variables 
respectively used in the research. While table 8 illustrates the summary statistics of dependent 
variables of merged firms. For computational convenience the entire data is treated as a 
pooled data and the statistics reported are for all the firms and industries taken together.  
Table 6: Summary statistics of independent variables used over years 1988-2008 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Size 
 
33962 3.285874 1.949877 0 11.11106 
R&D intensity 
 
26899 0.00897 0.771494 0 125.6 
Capital 
intensity 
29727 17.13206 563.5216 0 86633 
Advertisemen
t intensity 
29992 0.009774 0.490687 0 83 
Growth 26569 1.73088 27.91123 0 3894 
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Bad debt 
intensity 
29992 0.0389 3.434275 0 563 
Market share 
 
32419 0.005151 0.021771 0 0.75773 
 
Table 7: Summary statistics for dependent variable of all the firms from 1988 to 2008 
Variable         Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PBIT/sales 28751 -0.05692 17.18076 -1520 1361 
PAT/sales 28751 -0.61871 18.99069 -1829 1171.5 
ROA 32756 0.048722 1.320827 -184.667 82.32249 
TE 23381 0.326961 0.268314 0.000763 0.993516 
Note: PBIT Profit Before interest and tax, PAT is for Profit after tax, ROA stands for Return 
on Assets, TE stands for Technical Efficiency. 
 
Table 8: Summary statistics of merged firms from 1988 to 2008 
Variable         observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PBIT/Sales 1530 0.081001 2.844183 -50.1923 87.75 
PAT/Sales 1530 -0.10279 2.200385 -66.1 6.916667 
ROA 1813 0.091692 0.204174 -4.23456 3.235294 
TE 1283 0.343094 0.260318 0.00269 0.983514 
Note: PBIT Profit Before interest and tax, PAT is for Profit after tax, ROA stands for Return 
on Assets, TE stands for Technical Efficiency. 
 
Page | 54 
 
 
No unusual values were reported. Large variation in values of R&D intensity, capital 
intensity, market share and growth was found across firms. Log of deflated values of assets is 
taken as a measure of size so data does not show wide fluctuations in absolute terms but high 
fluctuations are noticed when only assets in crude form were analysed. From table 7 it can be 
observed that the average profitability (PBIT/Sales and PAT/sales) of the firms is negative. 
This is mainly due to high losses suffered by agriculture, Hunting and forestry (code 01) & 
Manufacture of Rubber and plastic (Code 25) industries. Industries like construction and 
electricity gas and water supply have reported a high average profitability over the research 
period.  This indicates that infrastructural development got a boost during the researched 
period.  
  
5 Empirical Estimation: 
5.1 Statistical Difference in means performance: 
The main research objective is to check if M&A leads to value creation. In a very crude way I 
try to answer this question by seeing if the mean profitability of the merged firms is greater 
than the mean profitability of all the firms taken together and the mean profitability of non-
merged firms. 
It is clearly evident from table 7 and 8 that the mean profitability of merged firms is higher 
than the usual mean profitability of all the firms taken together but is this difference 
statistically significant? This question can be answered by doing a usual two-sample mean 
comparison test. I conducted 8 such tests in total for four different measures of performance 
namely PBIT/sales, PAT/sales, ROA and TE. Four tests tested the difference in the means of 
merged and non-merged firms and four tests compared means of merged firms and all the 
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firms. The results of these tests are shown in the appendix. From the results obtained it can be 
concluded that when  PBIT/sales is taken as a measure of performance the difference in 
means are not found to be statistically significant while for other three measures of 
performance namely ROA, PAT/Sales and Technical efficiency the difference in means are 
found to be significant at 5% level of significance.  
It is interesting to note that when PAT/sales is used as a measure of performance the 
difference in means is significant as opposed to insignificant difference when PBIT/sales is 
used as a measure of performance. This possibly indicates that merged firms end up paying 
lower taxes than non-merged firms and thus the preposition that mergers bring tax benefits 
seem to be true. But this evidence is not enough to conclude that merged firms are more 
profitable than non-merged firms so we move ahead to regression analysis to check if merger 
and acquisition help in enhancing company performance.   
But this method does not say anything about causalities. So we move on to regression 
analysis. 
     5.2 Least Square Results: 
The results obtained by Ordinary Least square (OLS) across four different measures of 
performance considered in this research namely PBIT/sales, PAT/sales, ROA and TE are 
shown in table 9. EqXDWLRQEKDVEHHQXVHGWRGHULYHWKHȕHVWLPDWHVRIWKHYDULDEOHVXQGHU
research. 
Table 9: OLS estimates 
           PERF 
IND 
PBIT/sales PAT/sales ROA TE 
Size .1722924 ** 
(2.32)  
.1938325** 
( 2.3) 
.0132474* 
(5.39) 
-.0147246* 
(-12.02) 
R&D intensity -.9454087* -1.205197* -.001244 -.0213861 
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(-6.5) (-7.3) (-0.26) (-1.16) 
Capital intensity 
 
.0012989 * 
(6.54) 
-.0013043* 
(-5.78) 
-2.99e-06 
(-0.46) 
-.0000527 
(-1.16) 
Growth -.0583878* 
(-6.76) 
-.1486359* 
(-15.16) 
-.0004977*** 
(-1.74) 
-.0009436** 
(-2.22) 
Market share -3.007408 
(-0.48) 
-.8563483 
(-0.12) 
  .0101592 
(0.05) 
.5466172* 
(5.58) 
Bad debt intensity 
 
-1.275684* 
(-11.01) 
-1.799576* 
(-13.68) 
-.0078467** 
(-2.05) 
-.0008646 
(-0.16) 
Advertisement 
intensity 
-1.051139 
(-0.54) 
-.9101659 
(-0.41) 
-.1378158** 
(-2.16) 
-.3620874** 
(-4.1) 
Merge 
 
.1202822 
(0.23) 
.3996293 
(0.66) 
.0287955 
(1.64) 
.0192121** 
(2.34) 
Note: PBIT Profit Before interest and tax, PAT is for Profit after tax, ROA stands for Return on Assets, TE 
stands for Technical Efficiency. *, **, *** indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance respectively. The numbers in brackets indicate t-statistic values. PERF stands for Performance 
measures and IND stands for Independent variables.   
Equation 3.3.1a is used to derive the results obtained in table 10.   
Table 10: Only lagged profit taken as an independent variable to check persistence in profits for Indian 
companies. 
            PERF 
IND 
PBIT/Sales PAT/sales ROA TE 
Lagged performance 
 
.3325856* 
(38.95) 
.3987472* 
(36.67) 
.0212384* 
(3.24) 
.8946158* 
(2673.40) 
Note: PBIT Profit Before interest and tax, PAT is for Profit after tax, ROA stands for Return on Assets, TE 
stands for Technical Efficiency. *, **, *** indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance respectively. The numbers in brackets indicate t-statistic values. PERF stands for Performance 
measures and IND stands for Independent variables.   
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Coefficients obtained in Table 10 reflect reasonable persistence in performance over years 
confirming the argument of dynamics of profits in Indian companies developed previously. 
When technical efficiency is taken as a measure of performance very high level of persistence 
in performance is noticeable. Such high level persistence (above 0.5) is found by Pawaskar 
(2001), Kambhapati (1995). While when PAT/Sales or PBIT/Sales are considered modest 
persistence is visible such modest levels are found by Muller (1990) and Lee (2009). But it is 
worth while noting that though the coefficient is significant when ROA is taken as a measure 
of performance results barely show any persistence in ROA over the years. Thus now this 
variable is included in the model to get the following results.  Equation 3.3.1b is used to 
derive following results. 
Table 11: Results with Lagged performance variable 
               PERF 
IND 
PBIT/Sales PAT/sales ROA TE 
Lagged performance 
 
.3602796* 
(39.58) 
 
.3632022* 
(33.63) 
 
0.093318* 
(7.12) 
 
0.8951498* 
(2678.82) 
 
Size .1509027** 
(2.41) 
.1242291*** 
(1.65) 
0.011886* 
(4.83) 
0.000501* 
(6.13) 
R&D intensity -.9855305* 
(-8.12) 
-.6705154* 
(-4.78) 
-0.0010856 
(-0.23) 
-0.0007127 
(-0.73) 
Capital intensity 
 
.006962* 
(6.93) 
-.0638319* 
(-54.68) 
-2.69E-06 
(-0.41) 
4.33E-06 
(0.37) 
Growth   -.0677509* 
(-9.17) 
-.0414481* 
(-4.85) 
-0.0004802*** 
(-1.68) 
-0.0000253 
(-0.86) 
Market share -2.226589 
(-0.43) 
-2.64734 
(-0.37) 
0.0211929 
(0.1) 
0.0451023* 
(8.64) 
Bad debt intensity 
 
-1.298301* 
(-13.38) 
  -1.338497* 
(-11.92) 
-0.0075049** 
(-1.96) 
-0.0008405*** 
(-1.9) 
Advertisement -.8473241 -.9080084 -0.1356035** -0.0141826 
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intensity (-0.52) (-0.48) (-2.12) (-1.53) 
Merge 
 
.0883813 
(0.2) 
  .006502 
(0.01) 
0.026088  
(1.48) 
0.011414** 
(2.06) 
Note: PBIT Profit Before interest and tax, PAT is for Profit after tax, ROA stands for Return on Assets, TE 
stands for Technical Efficiency. *, **, *** indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance respectively. The numbers in brackets indicate t-statistic values. PERF stands for Performance 
measures and IND stands for Independent variables.   
Significance and signs of coefficients:  
In addition to merge, the key variable of interest, effects of 8 other variables discussed in 
section 4.2.3 can be observed from the results drawn. When dynamics of profit is considered, 
changes can be observed in values of coefficients of most of the variables. However, not 
much difference is seen in the relationship of these variables with profit except for size and 
capital intensity which changed from having negative relationship in table 9 and to positive in 
table 11 when TE is assumed as a measure of performance. Alterations in significance of a 
few coefficients are observed across two regression results. Under PBIT/sales the 
significance of size changes from 5% to 10% when we move from OLS to dynamic model 
OLS. Similarly significance of growth changes from 10% level in OLS to 5% level in 
dynamic OLS when ROA is taken as a measure of performance. Lastly bad debt intensity 
becomes significant when Dynamic OLS model is used. Maximum changes are seen when 
TE is taken as a measure of performance.  Variables like size, R&D intensity, capital 
intensity, growth, bad debt intensity are repeatedly seen to be significant across various 
measures of performance and two distinct model specifications in table 9 and 11. The 
coefficients of size, Bad debt intensity, Lagged Profit variable and Merge carry expected 
signs. Size when technical efficiency is taken as a measure of performance is negative under 
OLS. This is consistent with the results generated by Aggrey (2010). As mentioned during 
explanation of variables there has been an ambiguity in deciding the relationship that 
variables like market share, Research and development intensity, advertisement intensity and 
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growth hold with profits. So an attempt is made in Explanation of results to clarify these 
relationships with the help of results reported above along with the discussion of significance 
of coefficients of the other variables considered in the research. 
Interpretation of coefficients: 
As many regressions and variables are involved only the coefficients which report 
significance and are important for explanation of results are interpreted from table 9. When 
R&D intensity increases by one percentage point profitability (PBIT/Sales) reduces by 0.945 
percentage points ceteris paribus. As R&D intensity upsurges by one percentage point 
profitability (PAT/sales) decreases by 1.205 percentage points ceteris paribus. Similarly as 
soon as a company grows by 1 percentage point PBIT/sales reduces by 0.0583 units and 
PAT/Sales reduce by 0.148 percentage points ceteris paribus. Merge is a dummy variable so 
it will be interpreted in the following way: When TE is taken as a measure of performance; as 
compared to a non-merged firm a merged firm contributes 0.019 percentage points more 
toward profitability ceteris paribus. When market share increases by 1 percentage point, 
performance (TE) increases by 0.54 percentage points ceteris paribus.  
Explanation of the results  
The main research variable Merge is seen to have no significant impact on profitability when 
performance is measured as PBIT/Sales, PAT/Sales and ROA for both OLS and Dynamic 
model OLS. These findings are in line with Meeks (1977), Muller (1980), Geroski (1988), 
Bild et al (2005) and Mishra and Chandra (2010). But when technical efficiency is taken as a 
measure of performance merger has a remarkable impact at 5% level of significance. These 
results are consistent with most of the productivity and Frontier Studies mentioned in the 
literature review (e.g. Sharkas et al, 2008; Lichtenberg et al, 1987; Harris et al, 2005). It can 
be argued from these results that synergy effects in form of increase in technical efficiency 
flow from mergers and acquisitions. Yet these effects may not be reflected in accounting data 
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due to high overhead costs which are not considered for computing technical efficiency 
scores.    
It is evident from table 9 and 11 that growth has a negative and significant impact on 
performance. This contradicts the generalization of growth having a positive impact on 
profitability. It is a probable confirmation of assumptLRQVPDGHE\0DUULV¶UHJDUGLQJ
growth not leading to profit maximization due to agency costs. That is managers may be 
undertaking a few decisions (like Mergers and acquisitions) leading to growth in sales due to 
benefits like prestige, power, high salaries etc attached to it.  It however is indicative of the 
fact that increase in sales revenues taken as a proxy for growth does not necessarily lead to 
increase in profits. This suggests that costs are increasing at a faster rate as company grows 
this may be in form of increasing overhead costs, again supporting the argument developed in 
the previous paragraph.  
The empirical results presented in table 9 & 11 indicate that Market share is inversely related 
profitability when PBIT/sales and PAT/sales are used as a measure of performance. Hence 
increase in market share has a detrimental effect on company profitability in long run. This 
again disapproves the general belief of increase in market share leading to increase in profits 
nonetheless this finding is not very surprising. These results are consistent with those 
generated by Mishra and Chandra (2010) who researched Indian Pharmaceutical Industry. As 
pointed by McDonald (1999) and Mishra and Chandra (2010) increase in market share may 
lead to increase in X-inefficiencies and it may also encourage entry of new firms in the 
market. However market share has a positive impact when ROA or technical efficiency is 
considered as a measure of performance. So increase in market share in reality leads to 
increase in technical efficiency. Hence the assumption of McDonald (1999) & Mishra and 
Chandra (2010) about market share leading to X-inefficiencies is questionable. All the results 
together indicate that as the firm grows larger, inefficiencies in form of higher costs creep in 
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which result in insufficient profit generation, yet again assisting the arguments developed 
above.   
The significant negative relationship of R&D intensity with performance is consistent with 
the findings of Mishra and Chandral (2010) who researched Indian Pharmaceutical 
companies though it contradicts the findings of Lee (2009) and Chen et al (2009) who 
however did not work on Indian Data. This relationship can be due to improper government 
regulations and patent laws as pointed out by Mishra and Chandra (2010) leading to 
FRPSHWLWRUVLPLWDWLQJDFRPSDQ\¶VSURGXFWV%HHQDZKRDJDLQZRUNHGRQ,QGLDQGDWD
records that R&D expenditure of domestic acquirers is more than that of foreign acquirers. 
This advocates that a huge sum of money is spent on Financial Research by Indian companies 
before taking an important decision like mergers and acquisitions in the above case. 
Moreover it also points toward the fact that the money spent on Research is not converted 
into profits indicating lack of proper technical support, knowhow and underdeveloped 
Research department. Additionally research and development expenditure is unable to lead to 
entry barriers. Thus R&D expenditure reaps no advantages for Indian companies and they 
should be more cautious while spending money on R&D.  
In accordance with the results generated by Delios and Beamish (2001) advertisement 
intensity is found to have a negative relationship with profits. The existence of U-shaped 
relationship proposed by Chen et al (2009) was also tested but no such proof was reported for 
the data under consideration. The sample evidence of this is produced in the Appendix Table 
N. Now if we look at results of growth in sales and advertisement expenditure together we 
can probably deduce that more effort and money is spent on advertisement expenditure than 
necessary by Indian companies, indicating nascent product markets in India. This perhaps can 
also be related to consumer attitude in a country like India where consumers relate more to 
the brand ambassador rather than the brand 
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Though this is the simplest approach it assumes that the slope coefficients gathered are 
identical across all firms which are restricted assumptions. This may misrepresent the true 
picture. So it would be advisable to move towards more complicated models. 
5.3  Random Effects Model 
The results of LM test or Breusch Pagan Test for testing whether pooled model or Random 
Effects model should be used are presented in appendix (Table O, P, Q, R) Since p value < 
.01for all the variables under consideration null hypothesis is rejected at 1 % level of 
significance stating that REM is appropriate.  Thus BP test provides sufficient evidence of 
existence of individual effects in the model. This motivates us to move to a more refined 
Random effects Panel data model. The results generated by this model are listed in table 13 
Table 13: Results of Random effects model from year 1988 to 2008 
            PERF 
IND 
PBIT/sales PAT/sales ROA TE 
Size 0.265749* 
  (2.63) 
0.193833** 
(2.3) 
0.013247* 
(5.39)  
 
-.03342* 
(-41.4) 
R&D intensity -0.94485* 
(-6.6) 
-1.2052?* 
(-7.3) 
-0.00124 
(-0.26) 
-0.01008** 
-2.33 
Capital intensity 
 
0.001074* 
(5.33) 
-0.0013* 
(-5.78) 
-2.99E-06 
(-0.46) 
4.05E-06 
0.36 
Growth -0.05481* 
(-6.48) 
-0.14864* 
(-15.16) 
-4.98E-04*** 
(-1.74) 
-0.00051* 
-5.14 
Market share -3.25917 
(-0.36) 
-0.856348 
(-0.12) 
0.010159 
(0.05) 
0.451742* 
7.84 
Bad debt intensity 
 
-1.13507* 
(-9.96) 
-1.79958* 
(-13.68) 
-0.00785** 
(-2.05) 
-0.00392* 
-3.08 
Advertisement 
intensity 
-1.15983 
(-0.59) 
-0.91017 
(-0.41) 
-0.13782** 
(-2.16) 
0.020767 
0.55 
Page | 63 
 
Merge 
 
0.072319 
(0.1) 
0.399629 
(0.66) 
0.028796 
(1.64) 
0.047191** 
2.35 
Note: PBIT Profit Before interest and tax, PAT is for Profit after tax, ROA stands for Return on Assets, TE 
stands for Technical Efficiency. *, **, *** indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance respectively. The numbers in brackets indicate t-statistic values. PERF stands for Performance 
measures and IND stands for Independent variables.    
In terms of the relationship of coefficients with performance and the significance of various 
variables the results are similar to those generated by OLS (Table 9) in the previous section. 
The coefficients of variables are highlighted where high dissimilarity was noted in terms of 
coefficient values. And t-values of those variables are highlighted where difference was seen 
in the significance of variables. No differences were noticed in the sign of variables used in 
the data.  Thus the interpretation of results will be very similar to that of OLS results. It is 
however evident from the highlighted values that most of the changes are visible when TE is 
taken as a measure of performance. Thus keeping in mind the results of LM test shown in 
table 4 it can be deduced that OLS was not very suitable when TE is taken as a measure of 
performance. Yet it should be noted that this does not change the analysis in previous section 
as the signs of the variables has been maintained and the variables that were significant still 
remain to be significant but at different level of significance except advertisement intensity 
and R&D intensity of TE. Not much variation is seen in the key variable Merge concerned 
here. Dramatic change in value of coefficient of size is noticed when PBIT/Sales or TE is 
taken as a measure of performance. The change is greater than 50% while the change in 
coefficient values of other variables remain below 20%.  Thus if important interpretations are 
to be made with help of coefficients then Random effects model should be preferred.   
5.2 GMM Instrumental Variable Approach: 
Growth is claimed to be endogenous by Dickerson et al (1997) thus we move on to this 
approach to see if any significant changes are visible 
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Table 14: Results of instrumental variable estimation approach from 1988 to 2008 
             PERF 
IND 
1 2 3 4 
Growth 
 
1.79168 
(0.87) 
 
-0.2372661 
(-0.15)  
 
0.1007393 
(0.71)  
 
0.004213 
(1.28)  
 
Size 0.734665 
(1.06) 
0.1258324 
(0.25) 
0.007042** 
(2.08) 
-0.013917 
(-1.14) 
R&D intensity -1.721 
(-1.45) 
-0.5967506 
(-0.71) 
-0.0519319 
(-1.03) 
-0.00251 
(-1.22) 
Capital intensity 
 
-0.04293 
(-1.41) 
-0.0592425 
(-1.61) 
-0.0045876 
(-1.05) 
-0.00018** 
(-2.04) 
Market share -7.88371 
(-1.16) 
-2.313971 
(-0.48) 
0.5602947 
(0.1) 
0.015997* 
(3.91) 
Bad debt intensity 
 
-1.60386** 
(-2.42) 
-1.383076** 
(-2.07) 
-0.1327434* 
(-4.45) 
-0.00816 
(-1.52) 
Advertisement 
intensity 
-3.02995 
(-0.85) 
0.4471066 
(0.17) 
-0.4663614* 
(-4.57) 
-0.13394* 
(4.21) 
Merge 
 
0.834992 
(0.85) 
0.0375286 
(0.05) 
0.0279346* 
(4.48) 
0.031542** 
(2.3) 
Note: PBIT Profit Before interest and tax, PAT is for Profit after tax, ROA stands for Return on Assets, TE 
stands for Technical Efficiency. *, **, *** indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance respectively. The numbers in brackets indicate t-statistic values. PERF stands for Performance 
measures and IND stands for Independent variables.    
Table 15: Estimation using Dynamic model 
PERF 
IND 
1 2 3 4 
Growth 
 
1.994199 
0.92 
 
-0.25676 
-0.2 
 
0.001771*** 
0.33 
  
0.001258 
1.86 
  
Lagged Profit variable 0.456764 0.367874 0.242561*** 0.895409* 
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Note: PBIT Profit Before interest and tax, PAT is for Profit after tax, ROA stands for Return on Assets, TE 
stands for Technical Efficiency. *, **, *** indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance respectively. The numbers in brackets indicate t-statistic values. PERF stands for Performance 
measures and IND stands for Independent variables 
A considerable change in the significance of coefficients is noticed when compared to 
previous models. But relationships of variables remain constant. Variables like size, market 
share, R&D intensity, Bad debt intensity, advertisement intensity and capital intensity  more 
or less remain on the same lines. However Growth which had a negative sign has turned to be 
positive for three variables. The significance of merge has remained the same when 
(PBIT/Sales), (PAT/sales) and TE is taken as a measure of performance but when ROA is 
taken as a measure of performance merge becomes significant at 1% level of significance.  
Growth having a positive relationship now states that the negative relationship observed 
previously was probably due to endogeneity problem. One of the important thing to notice is 
 1.19 1.53 1.92 2661.64 
Size 
 
0.743684 
1.06 
0.072372 
0.16 
0.00965 
1.85 
0.000646* 
6.16 
R&D intensity -1.7054 
-1.44 
-0.59677 
-0.79 
-0.0013 
-0.64 
-0.00081 
-1.07 
Capital intensity 
 
-0.05736 
-1.44 
-0.05676* 
-2.3 
-9.3E-05 
-0.57 
-0.00021 
-2.26 
Market share 
 
-8.32696 
-1.17 
-2.61156 
-0.82 
0.035664 
0.24 
0.04157* 
7.66 
Bad debt intensity 
 
-1.51515** 
-2.38 
-1.31638* 
-2.12 
 -0.00705* 
-4.1 
 0.003264 
1.69 
Advertisement 
intensity 
-3.05679 
-0.84 
-0.53176 
-0.23 
-0.13472* 
-5.62 
-0.0196* 
-1.74 
Merge 
 
.851512 
0.86 
-0.09739 
-0.15 
0.023765* 
3.82 
0.00125** 
2.22 
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merge when PAT/sales is taken as a measure of performance bears a negative sign but its not 
significant.  
Interpretation of coefficients 
Under ROA as a measure of performance merged firms contribute .0237 percentage points 
more than non merged firm in a dynamic model. When market share increases by 1 
percentage point  Technical Efficiency increases by 0.04 percentage points.  
6 Conclusion: 
To the best of my knowledge this is the first study to analyze mergers across so many 
measures of performances with varied estimation techniques. My results report that when 
Technical Efficiency is taken as a measure of performance, mergers have a significant impact  
irrespective of the estimation technique used. This indicates that mergers result in optimum 
utilization of inputs and outputs and thus produce synergies in terms of increased efficiencies 
but when accounting measures of performance are used, only GMM estimation shows 
significant results for one of the three accounting measures of performance (ROA). Hence it 
can be claimed that mergers are not successful in increasing accounting profitability.  The 
increasing efficiencies from mergers are not visible in accounting profitability owing to 
increasing overhead costs. Lofty amounts are spent by Indian companies on Financial 
Research and advertisement expenditure.  This can be traced down to improper government 
regulations, underdeveloped patent laws and consumer behaviour patterns discussed in the 
results.  A  negative relationship is observed between market share and profitability when 
PBIT/sales or PAT/sales is taken as a measure of performance. McDonald (1999) and Mishra 
and Chandra (2010) blame it on X-inefficiencies but this assumption appears to be invalid in 
the context of my research as market share is reported to have a positive impact on technical 
efficiency demonstrating that increase in market share in real sense leads to increase in 
efficiency.   
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If we club a few evidences generated in the research up till now, it can be guessed that 
Mergers and acquisitions which are driven by the motive of market power succeed in 
increasing technical efficiencies, but these increases are not visible in accounting profits due 
to high overhead costs. These evidences are firstly regarding Market power being a driving 
force for undertaking mergers, Secondly most mergers being horizontal in nature in Indian 
economy & Lastly mergers and increase in market share enhancing technical efficiencies,  
In reference to the definition of value creation mentioned in section 2 Indian mergers can be 
termed to have created value.  
7 Limitations of Research and Scope for Future investigation: 
The best available model for exploring the dynamics of profits keeping in mind the data 
structure (smaller time dimensions and greater individual dimensions) would have been the 
corrected LSDV model recommended by Kiviet (1995). As time dimensions get larger other 
models generate equally good results. The time dimension in this study is close to 20 years 
(though the panel is not balanced) so even the instrumental variable approach a special case of 
GMM proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) for dynamic model should have been considered. 
But these models involve first differencing in initial (AH model) or later stages (corrected 
LSDV). First differencing gets rid of all the dummies in the model. As the most important 
research variable (merge) was a dummy these models could not be used in this study. Even 
applying the model projected by Arellano and Bond (1991) was infeasible because of similar 
reasons. Fixed Effects Model could not be used due to coexistence of  large no of companies 
and dummy variable.  
These models could have been used if pre-merger and post-merger data was available as this 
would get rid of the merger dummy. Moreover a more upcoming approach of propensity 
score matching could have been used to analyze the effects of mergers and acquisitions. 
Propensity score matching invokes certain assumptions  
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Appendix: 
Two-sample mean comparison test for checking if the difference in means is statistically significant. 
PBIT/sales of merged and all firms compared.   
 
PBIT/sales of merged and non-merged firms compared. 
 
 
 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1344         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2688          Pr(T > t) = 0.8656
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  11022.1
    diff = mean(Perf1) - mean(perf1M)                             t =  -1.1059
                                                                              
    diff             -.1379178    .1247152                -.382382    .1065465
                                                                              
combined     30281   -.0499487    .0962754     16.7533   -.2386525     .138755
                                                                              
  perf1M      1530    .0810005     .072713    2.844183   -.0616272    .2236281
   Perf1     28751   -.0569173    .1013248    17.18076   -.2555186    .1416841
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with unequal variances
. ttest Perf1 == perf1M, unpaired unequal
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1300         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2600          Pr(T > t) = 0.8700
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  12113.9
    diff = mean(perf1N) - mean(Perf1M)                            t =  -1.1264
                                                                              
    diff             -.1456696    .1293203                -.399158    .1078187
                                                                              
combined     28751   -.0569173    .1013248    17.18076   -.2555186    .1416841
                                                                              
  Perf1M      1530    .0810005     .072713    2.844183   -.0616272    .2236281
  perf1N     27221   -.0646692    .1069418    17.64411   -.2742806    .1449423
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with unequal variances
. ttest perf1N == Perf1M, unpaired unequal
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  21411.6
    diff = mean(perf2N) - mean(Perf2M)                            t =  -4.1613
                                                                              
    diff              -.544913    .1309483               -.8015815   -.2882445
                                                                              
combined     28751   -.6187091     .111999    18.99069   -.8382324   -.3991858
                                                                              
  Perf2M      1530   -.1027939    .0562539    2.200385   -.2131369    .0075492
  perf2N     27221   -.6477069    .1182496    19.50974   -.8794821   -.4159318
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with unequal variances
. ttest perf2N == Perf2M, unpaired unequal
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  16778.7
    diff = mean(perf3N) - mean(Perf3M)                            t =  -5.0051
                                                                              
    diff             -.0454875    .0090882               -.0633013   -.0276737
                                                                              
combined     32756     .048722    .0072979    1.320827    .0344178    .0630263
                                                                              
  Perf3M      1813    .0916919    .0047951    .2041742    .0822873    .1010965
  perf3N     30943    .0462043    .0077202    1.358032    .0310724    .0613363
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with unequal variances
. ttest perf3N == Perf3M, unpaired unequal
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.0114         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0228          Pr(T > t) = 0.9886
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  1445.25
    diff = mean(perf4N) - mean(Perf4M)                            t =  -2.2793
                                                                              
    diff               -.01707    .0074891               -.0317606   -.0023794
                                                                              
combined     23381    .3269605    .0017547    .2683141    .3235211    .3303999
                                                                              
  Perf4M      1283    .3430938    .0072676    .2603179    .3288361    .3573515
  perf4N     22098    .3260238    .0018079     .268747    .3224802    .3295674
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with unequal variances
. ttest perf4N == Perf4M, unpaired unequal
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  20524.3
    diff = mean(perf2) - mean(perf2M)                             t =  -4.1164
                                                                              
    diff             -.5159152    .1253327               -.7615773   -.2702531
                                                                              
combined     30281   -.5926416    .1063799    18.51164   -.8011508   -.3841324
                                                                              
  perf2M      1530   -.1027939    .0562539    2.200385   -.2131369    .0075492
   perf2     28751   -.6187091     .111999    18.99069   -.8382324   -.3991858
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with unequal variances
. ttest perf2 == perf2M, unpaired unequal
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0156         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0311          Pr(T > t) = 0.9844
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  1435.56
    diff = mean(perf4) - mean(perf4M)                             t =  -2.1579
                                                                              
    diff             -.0161333    .0074764               -.0307992   -.0014674
                                                                              
combined     24664    .3277997     .001706    .2679228    .3244559    .3311436
                                                                              
  perf4M      1283    .3430938    .0072676    .2603179    .3288361    .3573515
   perf4     23381    .3269605    .0017547    .2683141    .3235211    .3303999
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with unequal variances
. ttest perf4 == perf4M, unpaired unequal
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  15367.2
    diff = mean(perf3) - mean(perf3M)                             t =  -4.9208
                                                                              
    diff             -.0429698    .0087323               -.0600862   -.0258535
                                                                              
combined     34569    .0509756      .00692    1.286609    .0374123    .0645389
                                                                              
  perf3M      1813    .0916919    .0047951    .2041742    .0822873    .1010965
   perf3     32756     .048722    .0072979    1.320827    .0344178    .0630263
                                                                              
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with unequal variances
. ttest perf3 == perf3M, unpaired unequal
                                                                              
       _cons     -.629567   .2827797    -2.23   0.026    -1.183835   -.0752996
       merge     .1202822   .5318808     0.23   0.821    -.9222404    1.162805
   markshare    -3.007408   6.239407    -0.48   0.630    -15.23707    9.222256
       bdint    -1.275684   .1158303   -11.01   0.000     -1.50272   -1.048649
      growth    -.0583878   .0086337    -6.76   0.000    -.0753105   -.0414652
      advint    -1.051139   1.932202    -0.54   0.586    -4.838386    2.736108
       capin     .0012989   .0001986     6.54   0.000     .0009096    .0016883
     RDinten    -.9454087   .1453611    -6.50   0.000    -1.230326    -.660491
        size     .1722924   .0742331     2.32   0.020     .0267905    .3177942
                                                                              
       Perf1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    7779641.52 22786  341.421992           Root MSE      =  18.376
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0110
    Residual    7691519.97 22778  337.673192           R-squared     =  0.0113
       Model    88121.5427     8  11015.1928           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8, 22778) =   32.62
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   22787
. reg   Perf1 size RDinten capin advint growth bdint markshare merge
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Square of advertisement intensity included to check a U-shaped relationship 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.8566807   .2275591    -3.76   0.000     -1.30271   -.4106513
       merge     .1616275   .4379769     0.37   0.712    -.6968333    1.020088
   markshare    -1.758181   4.726997    -0.37   0.710    -11.02338    7.507013
       bdint    -1.156309   .0863549   -13.39   0.000     -1.32557   -.9870481
      growth    -.0821804   .0067284   -12.21   0.000    -.0953685   -.0689922
      advint     2.632113   1.114226     2.36   0.018     .4481645    4.816062
       capin     .0221914   .0006949    31.93   0.000     .0208292    .0235535
    LRDinten    -1.549237   1.127502    -1.37   0.169    -3.759209    .6607346
        size     .1835221   .0591549     3.10   0.002     .0675751    .2994692
                                                                              
       Perf1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    6311416.67 24834  254.144184           Root MSE      =  15.359
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0718
    Residual    5856345.99 24826  235.895673           R-squared     =  0.0721
       Model    455070.679     8  56883.8349           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8, 24826) =  241.14
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   24835
. reg   Perf1 size LRDinten capin advint growth bdint markshare merge
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.121821   .3211969    -3.49   0.000    -1.751389   -.4922527
       merge     .3996293   .6041399     0.66   0.508    -.7845261    1.583785
   markshare     .8563483   7.087067     0.12   0.904    -13.03479    14.74748
       bdint    -1.799576   .1315666   -13.68   0.000    -2.057456   -1.541697
      growth    -.1486359   .0098066   -15.16   0.000    -.1678576   -.1294142
      advint    -.9101659   2.194703    -0.41   0.678    -5.211933    3.391601
       capin    -.0013043   .0002256    -5.78   0.000    -.0017465    -.000862
     RDinten    -1.205197   .1651092    -7.30   0.000    -1.528823    -.881572
        size     .1938325    .084318     2.30   0.022     .0285633    .3591016
                                                                              
       perf2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    10160218.5 22786  445.897413           Root MSE      =  20.872
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0230
    Residual    9923355.24 22778  435.655248           R-squared     =  0.0233
       Model    236863.225     8  29607.9031           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8, 22778) =   67.96
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   22787
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.080488   .2653804    -4.07   0.000     -1.60065   -.5603269
       merge    -.1615961   .5107705    -0.32   0.752    -1.162737    .8395444
   markshare    -2.806347   5.512643    -0.51   0.611    -13.61146    7.998762
       bdint    -1.272699   .1007075   -12.64   0.000    -1.470092   -1.075307
      growth    -.0696245   .0078467    -8.87   0.000    -.0850046   -.0542445
      advint     33.77727   1.299415    25.99   0.000     31.23034     36.3242
       capin    -.0309598   .0008104   -38.20   0.000    -.0325483   -.0293713
    LRDinten    -1.389988   1.314898    -1.06   0.290    -3.967266     1.18729
        size     .1968716   .0689866     2.85   0.004     .0616537    .3320895
                                                                              
       perf2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     8618006.6 24834  347.024507           Root MSE      =  17.912
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0755
    Residual    7964819.28 24826  320.825718           R-squared     =  0.0758
       Model    653187.321     8  81648.4151           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8, 24826) =  254.49
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   24835
. reg   perf2 size LRDinten capin advint growth bdint markshare merge
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.66e+14   1.66e+14    -1.00   0.316    -4.91e+14    1.59e+14
       merge     6.50e+13   3.08e+14     0.21   0.833    -5.39e+14    6.69e+14
      advint     1.05e+14   1.12e+15     0.09   0.925    -2.09e+15    2.29e+15
       bdint     1.91e+12   6.69e+13     0.03   0.977    -1.29e+14    1.33e+14
   markshare     1.34e+13   3.63e+15     0.00   0.997    -7.09e+15    7.12e+15
      growth    -1.01e+12   5.71e+12    -0.18   0.860    -1.22e+13    1.02e+13
       capin    -8.38e+09   1.15e+11    -0.07   0.942    -2.33e+11    2.16e+11
     RDinten     1.57e+12   8.39e+13     0.02   0.985    -1.63e+14    1.66e+14
        size     2.57e+13   4.33e+13     0.59   0.553    -5.92e+13    1.11e+14
                                                                              
       perf5        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2.5130e+36 22331  1.1253e+32           Root MSE      =  1.1e+16
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0003
    Residual    2.5129e+36 22323  1.1257e+32           R-squared     =  0.0000
       Model    5.9171e+31     8  7.3964e+30           Prob > F      =  0.9998
                                                       F(  8, 22323) =    0.07
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   22332
. reg   perf5 size   RDinten capin  growth  markshare bdint advint merge
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       _cons    -.6208866   .2834426    -2.19   0.028    -1.176453   -.0653197
      advsqr     .2790073   .6204013     0.45   0.653    -.9370216    1.495036
   markshare    -2.964842   6.240234    -0.48   0.635    -15.19613    9.266443
       bdint    -1.275852    .115833   -11.01   0.000    -1.502892   -1.048811
      growth    -.0583808   .0086339    -6.76   0.000    -.0753037   -.0414578
       merge     .1234747   .5319375     0.23   0.816    -.9191591    1.166108
      advint    -3.045165   4.836651    -0.63   0.529    -12.52533    6.435001
       capin      .001299   .0001986     6.54   0.000     .0009097    .0016884
     RDinten     -.945131    .145365    -6.50   0.000    -1.230056   -.6602057
        size     .1730539   .0742537     2.33   0.020     .0275116    .3185961
                                                                              
       Perf1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    7779641.52 22786  341.421992           Root MSE      =  18.376
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0109
    Residual    7691451.68 22777  337.685019           R-squared     =  0.0113
       Model    88189.8391     9  9798.87101           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  9, 22777) =   29.02
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   22787
. reg  Perf1 size RDinten capin advint merge growth bdint markshare advsqr
